减少损失(Mitigationofdamages)-英国合同法

2023年12月23日发(作者：choruses)

1 序言

受害方向违约方或侵权方索赔损失时，被告常常会争辩道“即使我违约（或侵权），可是我违约本来也不会造成这么大后果啊!是你没有采取合理措施减少损失，才会有这么多的损失，我只能赔你这部分，其他一概不赔!”的确，除了“损失的遥远性”（remoteness）与“因果关系”(causation)的局限外，还有受害方减少损失的责任，而且，这三个局限赔偿的大原则都是有相互的密切关系的。在减少损失的大原则下，每个受害方都应该合理地去减少自己的损失，如果没有合理减少损失的话，他就不能把自己应能减少而没有去减少的那部分损失向违约方索赔回来。这一大原则是有几个方面的大道理去支持的，如下：（一）与因果关系有一定的关系，就是违约方/侵权方虽然有赔偿责任，但受害方没有合理减少损失而造成的部分额外损失与原来的违约或侵权没有直接的因果关系。（二）与损失的遥远性也有一定关系，就是违约方/侵权方是没有料想到受害方是不会合理减少损失的，所以额外的损失在本质上是太遥远。（三）要求受害方去合理减少损失是为了避免整体的经济损失与浪费。（四）这涉及了公平对待双方当事人，就是受害人如果想多花钱，他可以自己掏荷包，没有理由要违约方/侵权方去承担他的奢侈行为。这方面可去节录Pearson大法官在Darbishire v. Warran（1963）1 WLR 1067所说如下：“he is fully entitled to be as extravagant as he please but not at the expense of the

defendant.”

针对减少损失的大原则，最权威的说法是在British Westinghouse Electric &

Manufacturing Co Ltd v. Underground Electric Rys. Co of London Ltd (1912) AC 673先例中，贵族院的Viscount Haldane说：

“The fundamental basis (of damage assessment) is thus compensation for pecuniary

loss naturally flowing from the breach; but this first principle is qualified by a second, which

imposes on a plaintiff the duty of taking all reasonable steps to mitigate the loss of consequent

on the breach, and debars him from claiming any part of damage which is due to his neglect

to take such steps.”(在计算损失，最基本的道理是去以金钱赔偿来自违约的损失，但这是第一个大道理，要受到第二个大道理的约束，就是强加在原告受害方的头上一个责任

去采取所有的合理行动减少因为违约所带来的合理损失，并禁止他去索赔任何部分由于其疏忽没有采取这些行动而造成的损失。)

要求受害方去合理减少损失的道理也很简单，可去以一个简单例子说明。比如买方因为市场价格下跌或己方原因拒绝收货，卖方应当合理尽速地在市场上把货售转售出去以取回一定货价。而不应任由该票货物闲置而导致最后霉坏不值一文，甚至还有一大笔的仓储费用与弃置处理费用，而这种情况在现实中会出现，特别是在受害方意气用事，明显不可行但仍坚持买方让步的情况下。这很容易客观看到如果要求买方（即使毁约的责任是100%的明确）赔偿全部货价并加上各种费用，是非常不公平的。这里当然会涉及了每一个案件不同的事实，例如同样造成这一个严重的结果是由于卖方没有办法去合理到替代的买家，例如是该票货物比较特殊，根本没有其他人要，或当时遇上金融海啸根本没有市场或替代买方。这一来，要求买方承担所有的损失就客观看是理所当然了，因为卖方有设法去合理减少损失，只是没有成果罢了。又例如该票货物（例如是一台特殊制造的机器）根本没有市场或不到替代买方，也不代表卖方没有合理去减少损失的做法。例如去尽快安排把货物转运回自己的工厂，或是以废铁价格处理掉，或是以大幅度减价去出售给原来的买方（但不放弃卖方将来索赔的权利：Payzu Ltd v. Saunders [1919]

2 KB 581; A.B.D. [Metals & Waste] Ltd v. Anglo Chemical & Ore Company Ltd [1955]) 2

Lloyd‘s Rep 456），等等。反正就是能够合理去减少损失，即使成效不会太大，受害方还是应该这样做。在《1979年英国货物销售法》之50 (3)是针对买方对卖方的毁约，也就是本段所介绍的情况，就说明表面的损失计算就是根据合约价格与市场价格的差别，只要是在违约当时有一个可供买卖的市场，如下：

―50(3) Where there is an available market for the goods in question the measure of

damage is prima facie to be ascertained by the difference between the contract price and the

market or current price at the time or times when the goods ought to have been accepted or (if

no time was fixed for acceptance) at the time of the refusal to accept.（如果有关货物是有一个可供买卖的市场，表面的损失证据是去根据合约价格与买方拒绝接受货物当天的市场价格。）

背后的大道理就是要求受害方应该尽快去合理减少损失，而只要有一个可供买卖的市场，去在该市场把货物处理掉是最合理的做法。同时，通过这样的处理，也可以去

出受害方实际的损失，也就是出毁约的买方应该负责赔偿的金额，因为通过市场出售给替代买方而取得的价格是最好的指标去出与合约价格的差价。正如The ―Clyde‖

(1856) Swab 23先例中，Dr. Lushington大法官是这样说：“It is the market price which the

Court looks to, and nothing else, as the value of the property. It is an old saying, ‗The worth

of a thing is the price it will bring‘.”

在进一步探讨减少损失的大原则之前，不妨先去简单介绍一下British Westinghouse

Electric & Manufacturing Co Ltd v. Underground Electric Rys. Co of London Ltd (1912) AC

673与Darbishire v. Warran（1963）1 WLR 1067的案情。在British Westinghouse先例，涉及了一座蒸汽机的出售，用在火车的车头。由于该蒸汽机不符合买卖合约的要求，本身在动力与经济的操作上有缺陷，这导致了受害方买方在使用了一段时间后购买另一台蒸汽机作为替代。该替代的蒸汽机是一个不同的型号，有更大的动力，导致了在操作上所带来的利润比原来一台蒸汽机即使在符合合约规定的情况下也更高。在后来的诉讼中，受害方作为原告索赔替代蒸汽机的价格以及其他有关的损失。但并不成功，因为判是替代蒸汽机所带来的更高利润是足够对冲买方的损失的。

在Darbishire v. Warran先例中，涉及了原告把被告损坏的一辆车子去进行修理，但修理是不符合经济的做法的。上诉庭判是被告只需要负责赔偿损坏车子所带来的市场价格的减损（diminution in market value），而不是高昂的修理费用。

2 减少损失的三个规则

损害赔偿中，受害方减少损失的“责任”实际上包括三个规则：第一，如果受害方可以采取合理行动减少损失而没有采取，则对其所受损害的赔偿只限于若他采取了合理行动仍然会承受的那部分的损失；第二，一方违约/毁约后，如果受害方采取的行动事实上避免或减少了的损失部分，那么损失赔偿亦要相应免除或扣减。既使受害方所作所为已超出了合理减少损失所要求的范围，他也不应去赚一笔；第三，受害方为减少损失采取合理行动而作出的花费，成功与否，可以得到赔偿。

这方面可以去节录《Chitty on Contract》（2008，30th ed）之26-101段：

“Mitigation. There are three rules often referred to under the comprehensive heading

of ‗mitigation‘: they will be considered in turn. First, the claimant cannot recover damages for

any part of his loss consequent upon the defendant‘s breach of contract which the claimant

could have avoided by taking reasonable steps. Secondly, if the claimant in fact avoids or

mitigates his loss consequent upon the defendant‘s breach, he cannot recover for such avoided

loss, even though the steps he took were more than could be reasonably required of him under

the first rule. Thirdly, where the claimant incurs loss or expense in the course of taking

reasonable steps to mitigate the loss resulting from the defendant‘s breach, the claimant may

recover this further loss or expense from the defendant.”

这三条规则在著名先例British Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co Ltd v.

Underground Electric Rys. Co of London Ltd (1912) AC 673中有针对，第一条规则是这样说：“…imposes on a plaintiff the duty of taking all reasonable steps to mitigate the loss

consequent on the breach, and debars him from claiming any party of the damage which is

due to his neglect to take such steps.”而第二条规则是这样说：“When in the course of his

business [the claimant] has taken action arising out of the transaction, which action has

diminished his loss, the effect in actual diminution of the loss he has suffered may be taken

into account even though there was no duty on him to act.”至于第三条规则，基本上就是第一条规则的衍生。

3 减少损失是否受害方承担的责任？

Viscount Haldane在著名先例British Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co Ltd v.

Underground Electric Rys. Co of London Ltd (1912) AC 673中，把减少损失称为是受害方的一种“责任”（duty of taking all reasonable steps to mitigate the loss of consequent on the

breach），这一说法就带来了一些争议。这是因为受害方如果有这一默示责任，就表示他没有去合理减少损失，就变了是违约并导致违约方/侵权方可以倒过来向他索赔。但实际上没有减少损失的后果只是不让受害方去索赔由于他没有合理减损而造成的这部分额外的损失。所以后来有不少先例对这一“责任”是有所澄清，说明并不是这样一回事。首先，可去节录Pearson大法官在Darbishire v. Warran（1963）1 WLR 1067中所说：

“For the purposes of the present case it is important to appreciate the true nature of the

so-called ‗duty to mitigate the loss‘ or ‗duty to minimise the damage‘. The plaintiff is not

under any actual obligation to adopt the cheaper method: if he wishes to adopt the more

expensive against the defendant or anyone else. The true meaning is that the plaintiff is not

entitled to charge the defendant by way of damages with any greater sum than that which he

reasonably needs to expend for the purpose of making good the loss.”

另在 The“Solholt”（1983）1 Lloyd‘s Rep. 605先例的一审中，Staughton大法官是这样说：“In this context it is perhaps worth repeating that the duty to mitigate is not in any

sense an obligation, contractual or otherwise. It is a condition attached to the right to claim

damages: see Mr Justice Robert Goff in Koch Marine Inc. v. D‘Amico Societa Di

Navigazione ARL (1980) 1 Lloyd‘ s Rep. 75”。另在上诉庭，Donaldson大法官也有同样的说法：“A plaintiff is under no duty to mitigate his loss, despite the habitual use by the lawyers

of the phrase ‗duty to mitigate‘. He is completely free to act as he judges to be in his best

interests. On the other hand, a defendant is not liable for all loss suffered by the plaintiff in

consequence of his so acting. A defendant is only liable for such part of the plaintiff‘s loss as

is properly caused by the defendant‘s breach of duty.”

4 减少损失大原则与其他计算损失大原则之间的关系

较早时候已经提过，减少损失大原则与其他计算损失的大原则，包括损失的遥远性，损失的因果关系，甚至是整体减少浪费，都有一点关系。但它们实际上还是不同的大原则或者说法，虽然它们经常会混淆在一起，例如在针对受害方穷困而无法减少损失的情况下，就往往与损失的遥远性分不开，这稍后在第9段会解释。针对损失的遥远性，是不去理会受害方到底合理或者不合理，只要损失类别是订约的时候双方料想不到的，就会属于遥远的损失类别。但减少损失就非常讲究受害方的合理性。它们之间的不同可以举两个先例作为介绍，第一个是The ―Borag‖ (1981) 1 WLR 274先例。案情涉及了被告错误扣押原告的船舶，逼使原告提供银行担保去放船。但由于原告的银行资信很差，导致了要去支付给银行全部担保金额的利息，Denning勋爵说从来没有听说过银行有这么严格的做法。在上诉庭判是这一损失属于太遥远的损失类别，与受害方是否减少损失无关。Denning勋爵说：

“It seems to me, as a matter of common sense and common law, that expenditure made

to obtain the release of a vessel from arrest should be regarded as an item of damages, and not

as mitigation. It is the natural way of dealing with it.

They are entitled to all the reasonable expenditure which they incurred as a result of the

wrongful arrest and getting the ship released: but not ‗unheard-of‘ overdraft interest of this

kind.”

另一个是Simpson v. Grove Tomkins & Co (1982) Sol J 347先例，案情涉及了被告律师的疏忽（没有去与对方律师交换合约），导致了他原来的客户也是本案的原告失去了一个购买房屋的合约，并最终导致了该土地转售给第三人而原告再以非常高昂的价格去向第三人购买。在第一审法院，认定原告这样做是合理的，并判被告要根据原告向第三人购买的价格去做出赔偿，金额是38,285英镑。但去了上诉庭，判决被改变，认为损失赔偿只应该局限在该土地原来在合约同意的价格以及当时的市场价格，金额是20,542英镑。至于去向第三人购买的高昂价格，被认为是太遥远的损失。上诉庭这样说：“The

question was whether the purchase of the identical property by the plaintiff, if the original

agreement to purchase fell through, ought reasonably to have been foreseen by the defendant.

The answer is no, even if it was reasonable for the plaintiff to pay the price that he did.”这等于去判原告没有不去减少损失，因为在做法上合理。但原告还是不能把向第三人购买的高昂价格向被告取回，这是因为损失遥远性的局限。

减少损失大原则与整体社会减少浪费也不一定有关系，例如在最常见的案件涉及了受害方要去市场买进或者卖出，就通常不会涉及到整体社会的资源受到浪费，只会在受害方去放任货物闲置一隅导致最后霉坏不值一文才会导致整体社会的经济浪费。

有看法是减少损失的大原则主要还是与因果关系大原则的关系最密切。这里可去节录上诉庭Potter大法官在Standard chartered Bank v Pakistan National Shipping Corp (2000)

2 Lloyd‘s Rep 511先例中所说：“The orthodox view is that the rule as to avoidable loss is

merely an aspect of the fundamental principle of causation that a plaintiff can recover only in

respect of damage caused by the defendant‘s wrong. The rule is… that the plaintiff… cannot

recover for a loss avoidable by reasonable action on his own part, because, if he could

reasonably have avoided it, it would not be regarded as caused by the wrongdoer.”

但在Uzinterimpex JSC v Standard Bank (2008) 2 Lloyd‘s Rep 456，上诉庭的Moore-Bick大法官是这样说到减少损失与因果关系大原则：“There was a certain amount

of debate in the course of argument about whether mitigation should be understood in terms

of causation. For my own part I accept that it can be viewed in that way, but I am not sure that

to do so adds greatly to one‘s understanding of the principles. If one analyses a failure to

mitigate in terms of a new event which breaks the chain of causation between the wrongful

act and the subsequent loss, it is necessary to recognize that the way in which the test of a

new supervening cause has traditionally been formulated must be adapted or applied so as to

take into account the relatively undemanding level of the duty to mitigate which the law

imposes on the victim of a wrongful act. It may be that in this case it sharpens one‘s

appreciation of the issues to view mitigation through the prism of causation…”

另是指《McGregor on Damages》（2009年，18th edn）之7-018段的最后一句有提到许多有关减少损失的先例，并没有去提到因果关系大原则（it is significant that the cases

on the avoidable loss aspect of mitigation are not full of references to causation.）。

最后去一提的是减少损失的案例虽然大部分都涉及了违约，但同样的道理也适用在侵权，正如在The ―Liverpool‖ (1963) P 64 CA中，Merriman勋爵说：“The classic statement

[namely of Lord Haldane], although made in an action arising out of a breach of contract,

applies equally, mutatis mutandis, to tort.”

5 受害方怎样才算是合理减少损失

总地来说，受害方合理与否，是要根据每个不同的案件去看。但由于受害方是无辜方，而且是经常面临毁约时是处于困难的境地。所以，在受害方所作出的补救行为，通常会是以非常宽松的态度去对待。有一个说法是受害方无需做任何特别的事情来去减少损失，除非这是他平时也会这样做的。如Viscount Haldance在British Westinghouse Co. v.

Undergound (1912) A. C. 637在689页所说：“the plaintiff is not under any obligation to do

anything other than in the ordinary course of business.

另一个说法是强调这合理与否是从受害方的角度去看，而不是从毁约方，就已经可以被接受。但也有明确的说法是受害方除了考虑自己的利益，也需要想到受害方的利益：Smailes v Hans Dessen (1906) 94 LT 492。比较近期在这方面的先例有Darbishire v Warran

(1963) 1 WLR 1067，上诉庭说：“The true question was whether the plaintiff acted

reasonably as between himself and defendant and in view of his duty to mitigate the

damages”。另在贵族院先例的Dimond v Lovell (2002) 1 AC 384，判是受害方所高价租用的替代车辆虽然对他是合理，但不能向侵权方取回。

在现实中，受害方只要对他的补救行为有一个合理的解释，加上去保留一些证据（通常是文件证据）作为支持，就已经足够。去宽松对待受害方，而不去动不动就质疑受害方到底有否合理减少损失，也符合常理。原因是一般的受害方都知道无论毁约的责任如何的明确，将来的索赔损失也不会是一帆风顺。撇开谁对谁错或其他的如诉讼风险等问题，光是一些客观环境就表示了能够对损失完全的到补偿的机会是不高的。这些客观环境包括像实质得到的金钱补偿肯定会有时间上的延误，期间被告会发生经济问题甚至倒闭，也有可能发生受害方自己因为资金流通的问题而被迫接受被告提出很不足够的和解要约，等等。但如果能够去合理减少损失，受害方就在发生毁约时马上可以得益，通常就是可以去少亏一点钱，而且这是不影响将来向毁约方的索赔。而索赔的金额能够去减少，也表示向毁约方作为被告的诉讼行动会相对容易与快捷。

这表示在现实中没有去合理减少损失的案件，导致了受害方的部分损失无法向毁约方取回，往往是因为受害方明确误解了法律的地位，加上一定程度的意气用事或不现实面对问题，致使损失的扩大。毕竟中国人也有说法是聪明的人能够大事化小，但愚昧的人往往就会把小事化大。举例说，在货价上涨的时候，卖方根据买方的违约（例如是没有准时开出符合买卖合约要求的信用证或指定卸港）去终断买卖合约，然后马上向买方作出另一个新的要约（re-offer），但要求在原来的货价增加20%。如果该货物是有市场的话，当时市场的价格还要高，例如是比原来的货价高40%。如果买方是意气用事或不现实面对问题，坚持卖方要以原来的货价交货，导致最终一拍两散，会有可能是买方成为最终的输家。在后来的诉讼，如果在责任方面判是终断买卖合约的卖方胜诉，就不存在买方可以向卖方索赔损失的问题。但买方还是损失了一个机会可以比市场价格便宜20%（40%-20%）的货价根据一个新的买卖合约向卖方买回同一票货物。但如果诉讼结

果是反过来，责任方面判是终断合约的卖方败诉（例如是判信用证并非是不符合买卖合约的要求），就会接下去针对受害方买方向卖方能够索赔的损失的计算。表面看来，如果根据市场价格的计算规则（market rule assessment），就很容易算出这票货的损失，即合约价格与市场价格的差价，说是上涨了40%。但由于违约的卖方曾经做出新的要约，如果买方接受的话，就可以减少一半的差价损失即原货价的20%。这就会有危险被法院或仲裁庭判是一半的损失是由于买方没有合理减少损失所导致，应该去扣除。当然，如果买方对没有接受卖方的新要约的有一个说得过去的理由，这就有机会被视为是合理。例如，买方指出卖方的新要约是有其他不合理的条件，如要求买方必须放弃将来对他的指控或索赔；或是去规定了一个很短的回复时限及无条件接受，是买方这类型的公司（例如是国营公司）无法在这么短时间内做出决定；又或是买方在卖方违约后的很短时间就已经与分买方（sub-buyer）达成和解协议，给分买方一笔钱作为不交货的赔偿，这导致了稍后卖方去提供这票货物的新要约已经毫无意义；亦或是买方有一点理由怀疑卖方这一票货物有问题，例如是质量上的问题。这种能够说的过去的理由是千变万化，反正去重复的是要求受害方去合理减少损失的责任并不严格。怕就怕买方根本给不出任何不去接受卖方新要约的理由，甚至有当场的文件证明买方是意气用事或蛮不讲理。这就对买方有危险了，例如说对卖方说：“我以后再也不跟你这种人做生意了！”。如果有关的合约是一个长期的合作协议，买方倒还可能有一个说得过去的理由，即缺乏长期与卖方合作的信心，因为卖方动不动终断合约甚至加上其他的事实（例如卖方是一家小公司或皮包公司）。但如果在这里介绍的一票货物买卖，也明知道有一票质量没有问题甚至已装船的货物，去买或者不买，就不存在需要去考虑跟什么人做生意了。这一来，同样的一句话“我以后再也不跟你这种人做生意了！”就可能不足以证明受害方的合理，甚至会被视为是意气用事。这方面可节录Devlin大法官在Heaven & Kesterton Ltd v.

Establishment Francois Albiac & Cie (1956) 2 Lloyd‘s Rep 316 (QB)所说如下：

“If goods are rejected in a c.i.f. contract for some reason that has nothing to do with

quality – the shipment date was wrong, or documents were not in order, or something of that

sort, so that the goods are properly rejected – and then the buyer goes out into the market to

buy goods of the contract quality, it is open to the seller to go to him and say: ‗Well, then, I

tender you these goods. These goods are of the contract quality. You are looking for goods of

the contract quality. You rightly rejected them upon a basis that had nothing to do with their

quality. If you are looking, therefore, for goods to make good your loss, here they are, and I

can supply cheaper than you would be able to buy them at the market rate outside.‘ If the

seller does that, that is a matter which must be taken into consideration in answering the

question of whether or not the buyer has acted reasonably, as it is his duty to do, in mitigating

damage.”

以下内容会对这一问题作进一步的详细讨论。

5.1 合理与否是根据事实的认定

在每一个案件，由于事实不会完全相同，所以合理与否是要去根据双方当事人提供的证据作出事实的认定。在McAuley v. London Transport Executive (1957) 2 Lloyd‘s Rep

500先例中，上诉庭的Jenkins大法官是这样说：“The question must be one of fact, as I see

it, in each particular case：Was the advice, and were the prospects of success of the proposed

operation or treatment, clearly put to the plaintiff so that he, as a reasonable man, would

appreciate that he was being advised that this treatment or operation would put him right. If

the evidence shows that, then it seems to me that the plaintiff, as a reasonable person, ought

either to accept that advice, or else go to his own doctor and say: ‗Doctor, this is what I have

been advised by Mr So-and So, the surgeon at Such-and-Such a hospital; what do you think

about it?‘ Of course, the plaintiff here never did any such thing as that.”

在该先例，案情涉及了被告在雇用原告期间，原告因公而导致手腕割伤，并同时切断了神经。原告曾经被外科医生诊断过，认为他如果动手术的话，就会有一个好的机会在3个月到6个月之间大程度的康复，并且有90%的机会令手指进行大动作的活动或35%的机会令手指进行比较细致的活动。否则，这样下去就会导致肌肉萎缩与一个严重程度的变形。但原告不听从医生的建议，并被法院看来是想打完官司才去处理。Jenkins大法官是这样说：“It seems that the plaintiff was averse to having the left wrist dealt with

until his legal claim in regard to the injury to the right wrist had been attended to.”这导致了上诉庭判原告没有合理去减少损失，而损失的计算只能是去假设原告有去动手术并康复的情况下所蒙受的损失。这方面Jenkins大法官是这样说：“In that state of affairs, what is

the effect, if any, on the quantum of damages of the plaintiff‘s conduct in relation to the

advice he received from these two medical men? It is not in dispute that, inasmuch as in a

case of this sort it is the duty of the injured party to mitigate damages, it is his duty to act on

any medical advice he receives to the effect that this or that treatment will give this or that

prospect of success. If he receives medical advice to the effect that an operation will have a

90% chance of success, and is strongly recommended to undergo the operation and does not

do so, then the result must be, I think, that he has acted unreasonably, and that the damages

ought to be assessed as they would properly have been assessable if he had, in fact, undergone

the operation and secured the degree of recovery to be expected from it.”

另在The “Solholt” (1983) 1 Lloyd‘s Rep 605先例中，Donaldson大法官也说：“whether the loss is avoidable by reasonable action on the part of the plaintiff is a question

of fact not law”，并说这一点已经在上诉庭的先例Payzu v. Saunders (1919) 2 KB 581已经有了定论。

这带来的结果就是如果在第一审（不论是高院还是仲裁庭）认定了原告有或者没有去合理减少损失，就没有机会能够去上诉对这一事实的认定作出改变。

但减少损失的大原则也会涉及到法律的问题，这主要在受害方是否有“责任”要去减少损失方面。例如在对方有一个预期违约（anticipatory breach），受害方拒绝接受违约的情况下，受害方是否需要去减少损失。又或是，受害方并非去索赔损失，而是有去索赔债务（debt）的选择下，受害方是否需要去减少损失。这些问题会在本章另段介绍。

5.2 对受害方合理的要求程度不高与认定并不稳定

已经在第4段提到过，英国法律对这种合理的要求并不会太高，毕竟始作俑者是违约方/侵权方，他的违约/侵权已经使受害方处于不同程度的困难的境地。因此只要受害方采取了一些看来适当与解释得过去的补救行动，他就可以获得全部赔偿。这方面去重复只是为了去节录有关的权威说法，就是在Banco de Portugal v. Waterlow & Sons, Ltd

(1932) AC 452中Macmillan勋爵所说：“Where the sufferer from a breach of contract finds

himself in consequence of that breach placed in a position of embarrassment the measures

which he may be driven to adopt in order to extricate himself ought not to be weighed in nice

scales at the instance of the party whose breach of contract has occasioned the difficulty. It is

often easy after an emergency has passed to criticize the steps which have been taken to meet

it, but such criticism does not come well from those who have themselves created the

emergency. The law is satisfied if the party placed in a difficult situation by reason of the

breach of a duty owed to him have acted reasonably in the adoption of remedial measures,

and he will not be held disentitled to recover the cost of such measures merely because the

party in breach can suggest that other measures less burdensome to him might have been

taken.”

虽然合理程度对受害方的要求不高，但这只是一个说法或原则。去适用在个别的案件，还是会有很多变数，只能说合理不合理本身就是一个非常不稳定的看法。由于每一个人对合理的看法都有一定的差异，加上每个案件的事实不同，所以在这一方面的先例也往往不管用，起不到太大的指导性。针对这一方面的不稳定，笔者可去节录Rajah大法官在The ―Asia Star‖ (2010) 2 Lloyd‘s Rep 12的新加坡上诉庭先例作为介绍如下：“The

many sub-rules, qualifications and nuances that have built up around the reasonableness

inquiry may not infrequently appear to be confusing and unwieldy. Nevertheless, when one

takes a step back to look at the object of this inquiry as a whole, it becomes clear that the

inquiry amounts to nothing more than the common law‘s attempt to reflect commercial and

fact-sensitive fairness at the remedial stage of a legal inquiry into the extent of liability on the

defaulting party‘s part. The concept of reasonableness in the context of mitigation is a flexible

one. In essence, it bars an aggrieved party from profiting or behaving unreasonably at the

expense of the defaulting party, and encapsulates notions of fairness, the principle of

mitigation confers on the courts considerable discretion in evaluating the facts of the case at

hand in order to arrive at a commercially just determination. The principle embodies a

fact-centric flexibility which, whilst remaining in harmony with sound business practice,

stands in vivid contract to the strictness with which rules in other areas of contract law are

applied.”

接下去就分段去介绍在各种不同情况下被视为是合理或不合理减少损失的先例，可以进一步理解笔者上述所讲。

5.2.1 受害方对减少损失的选择并非是最有效或最省钱的情况

经常见到违约/违约方会辩称：受害方本来还有其他更有效更省钱的措施可选择，可以更大程度减少损失，甚至令他不需要赔偿，但这种说法通常不会被法院或仲裁庭接受。比如在租船业务中，经常是违反租约的船东辩称承租人后来的替代船太贵，据他所知当时还有另外几艘更便宜的船舶可以租进，承租人没有去租进更便宜的船舶就是没有减少损失。但这是不能被接受的说法，因为这种指责往往只是事后诸葛亮。在现实中，在发生违约的时候受害方往往是无法看到全局的市场情况的，所以受害方不会被视为是没有去合理减少损失，因为事后去看，受害方是有可能到比较便宜的替代船舶的，并非表示受害方不合理。这方面有许多权威的说法，首先去节录Banco de Portugal v.

Waterlow（1932）A. C. 452先例中，贵族院的Macmillan勋爵说：“…it is often easy after

an emergency has passed to criticize the steps which have been taken to meet it, but such

criticism does not come well from those who have themselves created the emergency.”

另可去节录Harlow & Jones, Ltd v. Panex (International) Ltd (1967) 2 Lloyd‘s Rep 509先例中Roskill大法官所说：“The defendants broke this contract. It is they who put the

plaintiffs in this difficulty. Of course, a plaintiff has always to act reasonably, and of course he

has to do what is reasonable to mitigate his damages. But he is not bound to nurse the

interests of the contract breaker, and so long as he acts reasonably at the time it ill lies in the

mouth of the contract breaker to turn round afterwards and complain, in order to reduce his

own liability to a plaintiff, that the plaintiff failed to do that which perhaps with hindsight he

might have been wiser to do.”

另在Emeh v. Kensington Area Health Authority (1985) QB 1012 CA，Purchas大法官说：“It would be intolerable if a defendant…having …placed the plaintiff in the position in

which a choice or decision had to be made, was able closely to analyse that decision so as to

show that it might not have been the right choice and thereby escape his liability.”

最后可去介绍一个有关先例Metalmann v. NBR (1984) 1 Lloyd‘s Rep 614，案情涉及了原告卖方Metalmann出售2,000吨食糖给被告NBR，FOB欧洲的价格是803美元一吨，付运期是1981年1月份。但NBR毁约，而当时食糖市场明显下跌，这导致了Metalmann为了去保护他的long position（因为在接下去的月份他也有去出售食糖），去在巴黎的食糖期货市场沽空5月份付运的2,500吨食糖，价格是673美元一吨。这价格

比违约当时的实际食糖价格市场略低，该价格是680美元一吨。这里要稍微解释一下食糖有两个价格，一个是实际市场价格（physical market price），这是针对实际货物的买卖，的确是存在付运与交货。另一个是期货市场价格（terminal market price），这些食糖并不进行真正的买卖，而是一些机构例如巴黎或伦敦的食糖交易所去让大家对赌。换言之，贸易商去进行买卖的对象是市场，而不是另一位贸易商。实际市场与期货市场的走势大致是一致的，但并不一样，而且每天的波动非常厉害。在该先例的第一审，Mustill大法官认为Metalmann没有必要在期货市场沽空，所以等于没有减少损失，赔偿只能根据实际市场价格的680美元一吨，说：

“A sale in the futures market is, for the reasons already stated, an effective measure of

protection where a seller finds that he has unexpectedly been left long in goods for physical

delivery on a falling market, and where it is plain that some time will elapse before the goods

can be resold. The potential loss resulting from the fact that the market will have fallen by the

time the resale is made, is matched by the opportunity to make a profit on the margin, by

repurchasing the terminal contract. In other words, the seller protects himself in respect of the

market risk during the interval before he is able to make a substitute contract. The theory of

this device will, however, only produce a practical result if (a) the seller is left long in

physical goods; (b) he does resell them for physical delivery; (c) the goods are actually

delivered; and (d) the futures transaction is closed out as soon as the new physical sale is

make, at which time the falling market has ceased to be a source of loss. As I see it, none of

these conditions existed here. Thus- (a) Metelmann never came into possession of ‗the‘ 2,000

tonnes of physical goods: (b) Metelmann did not resell ‗the‘ 2,000 goods were for physical

delivery: hence (c) ‗the‘ goods were not actually delivered: and hence also (d) the closing-out

of the terminal transaction (whenever it happened) was not related to any resale of physical

goods. In these circumstances, I consider that the futures transaction did not serve to mitigate

any real loss by Metelmann. This does not mean that I disbelieve the evidence of Mr.

Robertson to the effect that the future sale was intended as a stop-loss measure to protect

Metelmann and hence NBR from further loss on a falling market. I do accept this evidence,

and I also accept that if the transactions had afterwards been carried out differently, the

futures sale might properly have been brought into account. In the events which actually

happened, however, the sale in the Paris market did not go to mitigate Metelmann‘s loss. It

was entirely independent of the loss, which must be computed as if the forward sale had not

been made.”

但这一判法在上诉庭被推翻，说是：“As a result of the default of NBR, MetelMann was

left long or longer to the extent of 2000 tonnes of sugar on a falling market. Whether they

were in possession of that sugar or had merely entered into a contract to purchase it is

immaterial. The reasonably anticipated consequence was that their losses would increase day

by day, subject to minor unpredictable and short-lived upward movements in the price. Their

duty was to take all reasonable measures to prevent this increase in loss. In a less

sophisticated market, the only available measure would have been to conclude another

contract for the sale of 2000 tonnes of sugar as soon as possible and at the best price

obtainable. However, in the sugar market they had the alternative of selling 2000 tonnes on

the terminal market. Furthermore, on the evidence, this is what any reasonable trader would

have done, since it involved no delay.”

5.2.2 受害方对减少损失的选择并不要求去向第三人提出诉讼

这方面的先例是在Pilkington v. Wood (1953) Ch 770，Harman大法官是说：“the

so-called duty to mitigate does not go so far as to oblige the injured party, even under an

indemnity , to embark on a complicated and difficult piece of litigation against a third party.”该先例的案情涉及了受害方原告原来的律师疏忽，没有把原告购买的土地的业权查清楚。事实上，购买土地的业权有问题，因为卖方只是该土地的信托人。在原告向他的律师提出索赔损失时，律师作为被告的抗辩是他已经向原告提供费用的担保，要求原告去向土地的卖方提出索赔，作为他减少损失的“责任”。但这一抗辩被法院拒绝，虽然在诉讼费用获得保障与卖方经济上看来值得去索赔的情况下，这一法律行动从表面看来还是不清楚是否有明确胜诉的把握。这种同类的近期案例有不少如Horsfall v Haywards

(1999) Lloyd‘s Rep PN 332 CA；Pozzolanic Lytag v Bryan Hobson Associates (1999) 63 Con

LR 81；Center Optical (HK) Ltd v Jardine Transport Services (China) Ltd (2001) 2 Lloyd‘s

Rep 678（香港案例）；Williams v Glyn Owen & Co (2004) PNLR 20 CA；等。另是即使向第三人提出起诉并达成和解，法院也不接受被告的争辩指该和解的金额太低，应该争取

更好的和解：British Racing Drivers‘ Club v Hextall Erskine & Co (1996) PNLR 523。

上述不少案例是针对专业人士作为被告，例如指律师的疏忽而导致损失。而针对这种案件，近期有一点改变，把一些向第三人去提出索赔并非是困难或要花费庞大的费用，但受害方并不去这样做视为没有去减少损失。这方面可以去节录《McGregor on

Damages》（18th edn, 2009年）之7-083段所说如下：“However there is now a preparedness,

appearing in professional negligence cases, for the courts to see a failure to claim against a

third party before suing the professional himself as a failure to mitigate: the classic Pilkington

v Wood is becoming interpreted as being concerned with the need to embark only on complex,

difficult and uncertain litigation. Illustrations are Western Trust & Saving Ltd v Travers & Co

(1997) PNLR 295 CA and Walker v Medlicott & Son (1999) 1 WLR 727 CA.”

在Western Trust & Saving Ltd v Travers & Co先例中，法院判有抵押权的贷款人应该先去采取行动把抵押的财产占有，而不是去全数向被告的律师提出索赔，否则就是没有合理减少损失。把抵押的财产占用并非是一个不正常或者困难的办法去执行担保。

在同样的道理下，如果有多于一位对受害方需要负责（特别是在侵权）的所谓的“共同侵权方”（joint tortfeasors），被告不能要求受害方原告去向其他共同侵权方提出索赔，要求他们负责至少是他们应该承担责任的部分损失。在The “Liverpool” (1963) P 64 CA先例，即使第三方就他所应负责的部分承诺赔付，受害方原告也没有必要去接受这一笔赔付来减少被告需要赔付的损失。Harman大法官说：“It has never been the law that a

creditor having a security against a third party for his debt must give credit for that when

proving in the bankruptcy.” 在该先例，涉及了船舶在碰撞之后沉船，港口当局（英国Mersey港）需要去把残骸清除。碰撞的责任是100%在Liverpool轮的头上，但另一艘无辜的船舶Ousel轮反而是沉没的船舶。根据当地的立法规定，沉船船东即使是无辜也必须承担清除残骸的责任与费用。港口当局去向Liverpool轮的船东索赔有关的费用与损失，法院判是港口当局没有必要去向Ousel轮船东要同样的一笔钱来作为减少损失的“责任”。而且也不需要把将来会把从Ousel轮船东取得的一笔钱在对Liverpool轮船东索赔损失时作出扣减。

针对The “Liverpool”先例，在《McGregor on Damages》（18th edn, 2009年）之

7-085段，有解释如下：“A claimant need not take steps to recover compensation for his loss

from parties who, in addition to the defendant, are liable to him. This is an undoubted

principle. Indeed, as Harman LJ said in The ‗Liverpool‘, ‗it is a principle which, strictly

speaking, stands on its own feet independently of mitigation, a principle without which it

would have been unnecessary for the legislature to make provision for contribution and

indemnity between joint and several tortfeasors‘. And the ‗Liverpool‘ shows that, even if the

third party offers payment of the amount for which he is liable, the claimant is not required to

accept it in mitigation. In that case the defendants‘ ship through negligence came into

collision in port with another ship which sank. The claimant harbour board sued the

defendants, whose liability was limited, for expense incurred and damages sustained in

clearing the port of the wreck. However, the claimants had also taken steps to enforce their

statutory right against the owners of the wreck to recover from them any expenses

outstanding after raising and selling the wreck, and not only had this amount been established

but the money had been tendered, refused by the claimants, and then put on deposit by the

owners of the wreck. In such circumstances the Court of Appeal held that the claimants were

under no duty to satisfy part of their damages by accepting the money already on deposit.

Harman LJ, delivering the court‘s judgment, pointed to the analogy that ‗it has never been the

law that a creditor having a security against a third party for his debt must give credit for that

when proving in the bankruptcy‘.”

有同样的说法就是原告可以选择任何一个被告去索赔是在The International Factors

Ltd v. Rodriguez (1979) 1 QB 351，David Cairns大法官是这样说：“A plaintiff who has two

causes of action cannot be met when he makes a claim against one defendant by the answer:

‗Oh, no; you‘ve suffered nothing by my tort because you have a cause of action against

somebody else.‘ That clearly cannot be right.”另在近期Peters v. East Midland Strategic

Health Authority (2009) 3 WLR 737的上诉庭先例与Haugesund Kommune v. Depfa (2010)

2 Lloyd‘s Rep 323先例，也有同样说法。

这种情况经常会发生，就是受害方可以有多过一个途径去索赔损失。这就可以联想到受害方去向一个途径取回他的损失，但稍后在其他途径索赔同一样的损失，受害方就

会赚取，这是完全违反损失赔偿只应该是复原的大原则。这方面的问题在部分侵权的案件还比较容易处理，因为法院是容许把第三人加进来一并审理的。这表示在“共同侵权方”（joint tortfeasors）的情况下，其中一位被受害方选中作为被告，他可以向法院申请把其他会是共同侵权方一并列为共同被告，然后让法院审理他们之间的责任与赔偿分摊。至于在合约方面，问题就比较复杂了。简单的一个事故，例如船舶受到危险品货物的损坏，是货方或者承租人的责任，甚至是都有责任。船东就会有选择可去向货方索赔，或是承租人索赔。由于今天不少在这种合约内都有仲裁条文，更加不存在合并审理的做法。另是，船东更会有可能选择只去向保险公司要求赔付，这是另一个取回损失的途径。笔者不是没有见过船东向保险公司获得赔付后，再去向承租人索赔同样的损失，并在成功后不去退还或告诉保险公司。这种危险对代位求偿权警觉性不高的保险公司尤其之大。针对这一个问题，在本章第11段会进一步探讨，在这里只是为了去说明受害方并没有“责任”要去向第三人提出索赔作为合理减少损失的行动。

5.2.3 受害方对减少损失的选择并不要求对第三人放弃权利

在先例Elliott Steam Tug Co. v Shipping Controller (1922) 1 KB 127，案情涉及了原告租进了一条拖轮，租约容许原告使用直到发出14天的通知去终断租约。在使用期间，拖轮被英国海军征用。但有立法去对受害方作出赔偿，所以原告承租人就向英国政府提出赔偿要求，损失是有两项：第一项是在征用期间要去付给拖轮船东的租金，因为租约并没有规定在船舶被征用的情况下可以不付租金；第二项是原告如果能够使用该拖轮所带来的利润。审判庭判原告可以胜诉并获得赔偿，但赔偿只是局限在30天，理由是认为原告有减少损失的“责任”，就是去向拖轮船东作出14天的通知去终断租约，就可以避免多去支付租金。该先例最后没有针对第一项的损失去作出上诉（看来是一个错误的决定），但上诉庭的Scrutton大法官看来是不同意审判庭的决定，说：“the owner of a ship

while under a duty to act reasonably to reduce damages is under no obligation to destroy his

own property to reduce the damage payable by the wrongdoer. The leasehold tenant of a

house would not be bound to stop paying rent to his superior landlord during the period

during which a wrongdoer prevented him using the house, because by so doing he would

reduce the damages the wrongdoer had to pay if by so doing he lost the tenancy of the house

after the wrong of the tortfeasor was repaired, or finished in its effects.”（作为受害方的船东

或二船东，虽然有一个合理减少损失的责任，但并不要去他为了去减少对被告的损失去毁灭他的财产[原告去向拖轮船东终断租约就有这一种的味道]。一个房子的长期租客如果他的居所因为被告的原因而没有办法使用，是没有必要为了减轻被告的赔偿责任而去对房东终止租约以减少租金的支付的。这一来，被告会可以少赔一点，但原告就可能失去了一个长期的租约。）

但情况稍有改变就会得出不同的结果，在先例Weir v. Dobell (1916) 1 KB 722中，原告是二船东，把有关的船舶分租给被告。在运费费率，分租约比第一份租约为低，这表示如果租约获得履行，原告会要赔钱，因为向被告作为分承租人所支付的运费不足以支付原告向原船东支付的运费。这种情况也经常会有，夹在当中的合约方不一定能够赚取差价，根据租入（或买入）的市场高低去比较租出（或转售）的市场高低，会有机会赚取或亏蚀的差价。在本先例，被告在履行的时候拒绝装货，这构成了毁约。对原告而言，第一份租约容许他有裁量权去终断合约。结果在双方的诉讼中，判是原告应该行使他的合约权利去终断第一份租约以减少损失。这被视为是合理的做法，而该先例中事实与Elliott Steam Tug Co. v Shipping Controller先例有所不同。第一个方面是第一份租约与分租约是针对一模一样的航次，第二是该航次结束之后第一份租约也没有剩下来的租期需要去保留。这估计是造成了原告二船东根本无法合理地解释为什么不去行使裁量权终断第一份租约。不去这样做的真正原因有可能是：（1）二船东没有这方面的法律知识，不知道裁量权是何物；（2）二船东疏忽，要不是没有去留心第一份租约的条文，或是延误导致了想去行使裁量权的时候已经过了规定或合理的时间。反正什么是真正的原因，都会离不开二船东没有去合理减少损失。

5.2.4 受害方对减少损失的选择并不需要花费太大的时间与精力

这里有涉及了合理与否的情况，要求受害方做太多或太困难的事情去减少损失就看来没有这个必要了。在Lesters Leather & Skin Co. Ltd v. Home & Overseas Buyers Brokers,

Ltd (1948) 64 TLR 569先例，案情涉及了原告作为买方向被告购买一批蛇皮，在英国港口交货。但货物运到的时候，被原告因为质量问题拒货，上诉庭判原告胜诉并可取回他的利润损失，并否定了被告所作出的原告应该去在印度购买蛇皮以减少损失的抗辩。这一判决的原因包括受害方不需要冒太多的险与花费太多精力去减少损失。其中，Goddard大法官说：“I cannot say that the buyers are bound to go hunting the globe to find out where

they can get skins.”（我不能要求买方必须去全世界寻蛇皮）。另Singleton大法官重复了第一审Sellers大法官所说：“It is one thing to enter into a contract. It would be another

thing to get the goods.”

类似的说法在Harlow & Jones, Ltd v. Panex (International) Ltd (1967) 2 Lloyd‘s Rep

509先例也有提到，Roskill大法官说：“he has to do what is reasonable to mitigate his

damages. But he is not bound to nurse the interests of the contract breaker…”

这里也可以去举一个比较近期的加拿大先例，Costello v. City of Calgary (1995) 163

AR 241。案情涉及了原告受害方准备在一块他所拥有的土地上建造一个40个房间的酒店，但该土地被当局（也就是被告）错误没收，这属于非法没收是加拿大最高院所作出的决定。这导致了原告后来向被告提出索赔损失，而在责任方面是十分明确，就是被告侵占了原告的土地。被告面对损失赔偿的其中一个抗辩，就是原告应该去减少损失，就是应该去购买附近另一块土地并建造一座同样的酒店，而原告的财力完全是能够做得到的。但法院不同意，认为这是一笔很大的钱，没有理由要求受害方这样做。加拿大Alberta法院是这样判：“…the evidence also established that the [plaintiffs] had sufficient credit

capacity to make such a purchase [ie, to purchase another plot of land as a replacement for

Ranch Site] had they so wished. However, the point is that the argument of the [defendant]

must be rejected because it has failed to establish that other comparable property was

available at [the] equivalent compensation [which] the [defendant] was offering, and the law

is clear that the plaintiffs need not incur unreasonable expenses to mitigate a loss caused by

the defendant…”

5.2.5 受害方对减少损失的选择并不需要损害他的名誉或影响商业关系

在Finlay v. Kwik Hoo Tong (1929) 32 Lloyd‘s Rep 245先例，案情涉及了一个CIF孟买的食糖买卖合约。买卖合约涉及了3票在1920年7月、8月与9月的付运。到了9月这一票货物的付运，时间上有了延误，食糖是在10月2日才装上船舶。这表示货不对版，因为付运日期一直被视为是合约的条件条文（essence of contract），买方有权可以不要这一票货物。但卖方交出了一份提单，日期是在9月30日。这就涉及了做外贸与航运的人士最熟悉的不良做法，就是倒签提单。至于导致延误付运的原因会有许多，例

如是CIF卖方自己晚了租船或者把货物备妥，或者是在装船前的运输（该票食糖是要通过驳船运输）发生运输上的延误，又或者遇上坏天气拖慢了运输或装货，反正原因是千奇百怪。任何一个原因就已经足够去延误1、2天而导致了9月付运的食糖变了是10月。这些原因可能涉及CIF卖方本人的过错或疏忽，但也可能是他完全无辜或控制不了。但这都不会影响CIF卖方的违约，因为他在买卖合约承诺了出售9月付运的食糖，而合约的承诺是严格责任。

再回到本先例，原告Finlay接受了这份倒签提单，并交给了一个印度的分买方（这票食糖较早前就已经转售给了分买方）。而分买方估计到食糖的延误付运，加上当时的食糖市场价格下跌，继而拒绝接受提单。这导致了原告Finlay被迫以拍卖的形式低价出售该票食糖，致使了原告的损失。

在本先例，Finlay作为受害方到底有没有去合理减少损失的争议涉及了在分买卖合约中，有一条条文说明提单注明的日期就是决定性证据（conclusive evidence）。这表示根据买卖合约的明示条文，Finlay可以坚持要分买方接受该票货物或向分买方索赔他不按合约拒货的损失，因为提单本身是注明9月付运。由于倒签提单并不涉及Finlay的不诚实行为，所以不影响分买卖合约中这一条文的有效性。但Finlay解释他不这样做的理由是为了保障他在印度食糖市场的名誉，不想去强制印度分买方接受一套倒签提单。上诉庭判Finlay并没有不合理减少损失，其中Scrutton大法官是这样说：

“Messrs. Finlay‘s answer to that is : ‗It is quite true that we had a contract under which

the India buyer was bound to accept the date in the bill of lading as against the India buyer to

recover the price of goods that we knew not to be in accordance with the contract, because of

that term, would not be in the ordinary course of business and would ruin our credit in India,

and as a matter of business, and of the standard of morality which should attach to an English

firm of standing, we decline to bring an action against an India firm to compel them to take

goods which we know are not in accordance with the contract. It would be different if we did

not know and it was in doubt, and we could say: ‗Yes, we do not know which way it is, and

you do not know, but here is a contract that the bill of lading date is to be taken‘; that would

be a different matter.‘ I personally cannot think that a man who has broken his can compel his

buyer who has not broken his contract to take action to minimize the damages of a person

who has broken his contract, by claiming money to which he knows he is not entitled, and to

take action which will ruin his credit in the business world.”

说实在，好像这种案件的事实真相（特别是全面的真相）没人能说清楚，例如会否是Finlay去向印度分买方在事前或事后根据合约的条文加压，指出分买方无权拒绝接受提单与货物，结果是印度分买方答应给Finlay一些“好处”作为交换Finlay不去向他索赔损失。把这些“好处”量化为金钱的话，应该也在损失中去作出扣减，只要这是在判决前能够曝光。但现实中如果有这种情况，Finlay也不会把这笔“台底交易”的好处自动说出来，而这种交易也不是被告Kwik Hoo Tong所能去自己查出来或通过文件披露而知道。所以，懂得法律与否并能够从中钻空子会是有天壤之别，短期还看不出分别（因为受到短暂运气好坏的影响比较大，例如一路没有发生意外），但中长期就会有极大的差别，懂法律的一方很可能从中赚取很大的利益。

另一个有关的先例The ―Lily Prima‖ (1976) 2 Lloyd‘s Rep 487，案情涉及了一个长期的程租租约，总共要去履行24个连续的航次。租约也涉及了分租约，也就是―Lily Prima‖轮的被告船东在第一个租约租给了本先例的原告承租人Yamashita Shinnihon，而原告再去分租给分承租人Nichimen。在分租约内有一条免责条文，说明在这24个连续航次的履行，如果发生了Yamashita Shinnihon作为二船东无法控制的原因造成了延误，就可以免责。

履行了8个航次之后，在第9个航次发生了延误。在1973年8月8日到8月30日，原告Yamashita Shinnihon一直催促被告船东给通知有关第9航次的旅履行日期。但船东一直给不出日期，到了8月31日才说是估计要到12月25日才能去履行。而事实上船舶是到了1974年1月12日才能够交船履行。在期间，原告为了去履行他的分租约，在9月初的时候，以高价在市场租入一艘替代船舶去履行第9个航次，并在事后向被告索赔高达1,759,826美元的运费差价。而被告船东提出的其中一个抗辩就是原告可以拒绝履行分租约的第9航次，依据的就是分租约中的免责条文。但这部被英国法院接受，认为原告受害方没有必要去行使他在分租约中的所有法律权利，他只需要合理。估计原告只需要去作出合理的解释，例如他必须对分承租人Nichimen履行，不管合约中有怎样的条文，因为大家都是日本公司，法院即可能会接受。其中，第一审的Kerr大法官是这样说：

“The other point on which the owners relied, though Mr. Saville (船东的代表大律师)

did not press it strongly, is that the charterers should have relied against Nichimen on cl. 17 of

the sub-charter and claimed that the voyage in question was delayed by causes beyond their

control, because the Lily Prima was unavailable to them at the material time and there was no

right of substitution. However, if a party to a contract is put in a dilemma or difficulty in

relation to his commitments by the other party‘s breach he is not bound to exercise all his

legal rights in order to extricate himself; he is only bound to act reasonably in all the

circumstances: see the authorities summarized in MacGregor on Damages, (13th ed.) par. 233.

Since it is found that the charterers acted reasonably, and indeed chartered the substitute

tonnage after being advised to do so by the owners‘ brokers, there is nothing in this point.”

5.2.6 受害方对减少损失的选择是否需要预先通知违约/侵权方?

笔者一直是觉得受害方在减少损失，合理不合理是要看很多的因素的。如果时间上容许，去向违约/侵权方做出预先通知并非是“坏事”，但这充其量只是去看整个行动是否合理的其中一个因素，而且不一定是重要因素。去做出预先通知的好处就是如果违约/侵权方不去马上做出反对或异议，将来就很难抗辩说受害方的行动不合理。例如，受害方船东在修理之前告诉会要承担损坏责任的承租人，船舶将会在美国的下一个港口装货前进行修理。如果承租人默不作声，或只是说“我不予评论，因为我没有责任”，这都会在将来令承租人指称这种做法不合理，因为在美国修理太昂贵。但笔者认为这并非是决定性的，最后还是要看整体的合理或不合理，而这方面的因素就会是很多了。比如，船舶是否可以等待下一个航次回到亚洲才进行修理？船舶是否会在下一个航次回去亚洲？这种修理在亚洲是否的确会比美国便宜很多？船东有否其他有说服力的原因必须要在美国修好？承租人如果做出评论或反对，会否改变船东在美国修理的事实或决定？等等。

但不论笔者怎么样想，最近就有了一个新加坡的上诉庭先例，认为受害方如果在减少损失时不预先通知违约/侵权方，就会是一种不合理的做法，这就是The ―Asia Star‖

(2010) 2 Lloyd‘s Rep 12先例。案情涉及了该船舶被租用一个航次，去印尼与马来西亚的装港装运21,500吨的棕榈油去中东、土耳其与黑海港口。但船舶有延误，而且在装港被检查的时候（2004年1月19日），船舱被发觉不够清洁来装运棕榈油。最终，这一艘船

舶没有跑这一个航次并在1月21日离开了印尼装港。这导致了承租人，也是作为CIF卖方的损失。这损失就是他这票棕榈油的供应是来自三位分卖方，其中一位由于付运的延误而取消了供应，结果只有两票货物能够用其他船付运，这就导致了承租人的利润损失高达698,889美元。承租人也涉及了其他的损失，例如是因为付运的延误要去赔给买方823,800美元与棕榈油的额外仓库费等等。反正整个索赔高达2,000,000美元。

但在船东违约后（船舱发觉不清洁被拒绝装货）的1-2天，曾经在市场上有另一艘Puma轮可以去作为替代的船舶，而当时承租人也在市场寻替代船舶，发觉只有这一艘船舶，而且比Asia Star轮大（Puma轮是40,000吨载重量），但还是可以作为替代。反正是双方在1月20日的谈判，作出了很快的发盘与还盘（offer and counter-offer）。最后大家只差2美元的运费，但Puma轮的船东就不再理会，显然是有其他更好的租约了。但在金钱方面，就算是根据Puma轮最后要求的运费，与Asia Star轮的租约运费相差也只是399,500美元。这就带来了承租人有没有合理减少损失的争议。如果有，就可以成功索赔约2,000,000美元。如果没有，承租人只能向船东索赔399,500美元。

在新加坡法院的第一审，助理司法常务主任（Assistant Registrar）在核算损失的时候，认为承租人没有合理减少损失，只能获赔399,500美元，所持的理由就是承租人明知棕榈油市场在上涨，很严重的面临被供应商因为延误付运而取消的危险，没有理由不去尽一切努力租下Puma轮作出替代船舶。毕竟要多去支付的运费差价与整个航次与买卖可以赚取的利润（高达1,500,000美元）完全是不成比例的。但这一判决上诉去了高院，Judith Prakash大法官有不同的决定，认为承租人没有不合理，也不应该事后去作出批评。她是这样说：“The Assistant Registrar had erred on the issue of mitigation. Acting

reasonably in mitigation did not mean that the charterers had to accept the terms offered by

Puma‘s owners without negotiation. Mitigation principles did not require the injured party to

incur extraordinary expenditure or act otherwise than in the ordinary course of business. In

the ordinary course of business, a charterer of a ship would negotiate with the shipowner to

get the best possible terms in the prevailing market. The defendant had called no evidence as

to what the prevailing freight rates and demurrage rates were on 20 January 2004, or as to

whether the charterer were acting unreasonably in relation to the terms of their offer to the

owners of Puma. The fact that events showed that the charterers would have lost less had they

chartered Puma did not mean that the charterers acted unreasonably in relation to their

negotiations with Puma‘s owners.”

但这去了新加坡上诉庭又被推翻，并挑出一项被视为是承租人不合理的做法，就是没有去把可能租用Puma轮作为替代船的事实告诉违约方船东。这可去节录Rajah大法官所说：“In our view, one important issue which the judge should have considered was

whether, in the circumstances, the respondent (受害方承租人) should have notified the

appellant (违约方船东) of the option of chartering Puma at the freight rate offered by her

owners. This would have given the appellant the opportunity to object to this option if it did

not deem it reasonable. The essence of the respondent‘s submissions on this point was this:

where additional expense had to be incurred in mitigating loss, it was reasonable for an

aggrieved party which was experienced in the ways of business to simply unilaterally evaluate

whether the additional sum was an amount which it was willing to pay, and then decide

whether or not to proceed with the mitigation measure in question. There is, according to the

respondent, no obligation whatsoever on the aggrieved party‘s part to notify or consult the

defaulting party vis-a-vis the available options for mitigating losses.”新加坡上诉庭并去依赖了一个古老的先例名为Mitchell v. Kahl (1862) 175 ER 1250的说法：“If you think either

that the plaintiffs might have got a smaller vessel, or that the improperly neglected to give the

defendants notice of the substitute charter, so as to give them the option of using the surplus

space, you may find for the defendants; otherwise, for the plaintiffs, for the sum claimed.”

对这一个先例，笔者由于没有去看证据，所以很难作出有价值的评论。只是观察到掌握“合理或不合理”的确是一个非常不稳定的认定，大家都会有不同的看法或侧重点。虽然在这一个先例是不存在这个问题，但在国际仲裁经常会涉及到不同文化背景的仲裁员，他们之间看待合理或不合理更会是有天壤之别，这不能简单说偏袒或不公正就解释得过去的。另一个观察涉及了受害方在采取减少损失行动前向违约方作出预先通知，这方面的复杂问题已经在本小段开头有涉及。而针对租船业务，笔者也有一定的经验，就是发盘与还盘来的很快，经常会有短至10分钟或5分钟的时限要求对方马上作出回应。这种情况也发生在The ―Asia Star‖先例。看市场对谁有利，会有一方，例如是船东同时与几个不同的潜在承租人同时去谈判，经常会有一位承租人决定无条件接受了船东在10

分钟前的还盘，但船东回应说你刚过了1分钟（甚至没有超过时限，但由于时限并非是一个有约因的承诺，船东不遵守也没有责任），我把船舶已经租给另一位承租人了。所以无论如何，怎样有诚意去谈判，也没有保证一定谈得拢。想有一定的把握能够谈得拢，就是不要去作出任何的反盘，也就是不要去谈判，船东只要肯去给出一个发盘就马上全面接受。在这种情况下，去向违约方作出预先通知是否现实与希望取得什么实际的效果，笔者是有疑问的。至于新加坡上诉庭指称在该案例中如果做出预先通知，会有可能违约方愿意承担或承担一半租入Puma轮的运费差价，笔者觉得是更加不现实。

5.3 合理减少损失要求较严格的说法

虽然这不是法律，但也有说法是对减少损失的行动应对受害方有较紧的要求，因为往往有情况是受害方需要冒一定程度的风险或多花费一些钱才会带来更好更大的“现净价”（net present value或简称NPV）。在多伦多大学一个报告〔by MacIntozh and Frydenhnd

(1987) 37 University of Toronto LJ 113〕，有结论是（在147与157页）：

“…damage should be assessed as the difference between the NPV of the contract and

the NPV of mitigation strategy，both measured as of the date of breach，and without regard to

the actual results of the mitigation or of the notional contract performance…(This approach

would involve) a reversal of the common law policy that the non-breacher need not take any

considerable degree of risk in mitigating damages：the‘duty’to mitigate should extend to a

risky strategy where it has the highest NPV of all available mitigation strategies… Equally，it

will reverse the common law rule that the plaintiff need not invest any non-trivial sum of

money in the effort to mitigate：the duty to mitigate should extend to non-trivial investment

where justified by the NPV of the mitigation strategy.

“By comparison, the economic approach suggests that the rules should be structured so

as to encourage the plaintiff to adopt his best mitigation strategy，whether or not this involves

investment beyond that contemplated in the original contract (albeit，where an ex post rule is

used，without taking inordinate risk.) If purchasing the new machines was clearly the soundest

decision that the plaintiff could have made (and this appears to have been the case) then this

investment decision should be encompassed within the duty to mitigate. ”

6 受害方对毁约方提出新要约的情况

众所周知，在合约一方声称对方毁约（不论是否最后能够成立）并且去接受毁约的情况下，就表示原来的合约已经终断。将来即使是判另一方并没有毁约，也不会带来原合约的重生，只会是声称对方毁约并接受毁约的一方自己变为毁约方。反正在发生了这样的事情后，通常双方会进行谈判，试图去继续履行有关的合约。在做法上往往会有两种：第一种就是去恢复原合约（reinstate original contract），但该原合约的条文会做出一些修改，例如抬高或减低原来的货价；第二种做法就是通过一份新的合约作为替代，其中有新的合约条文，但这是与原合约分开，也不影响原合约的争议与索赔权利。这表示在新合约下，会是货价比原合约有所抬高或减低。这显然会导致合约一方的损失，他可以去提起诉讼，指称他没有在原合约毁约，毁约的实际上是对方，而带来的损失就是原合约与新合约之间的差价。

要有一个新的合约，就涉及了新的要约（re-offer）与接受（acceptance），反正是与产生一个有效合约的要求是完全一致。通常，会是毁约方或担心自己会构成毁约的一方去向受害方提出新的要约，这里的其中一个目的是为了迫使受害方减少损失。的确也有情况是这种新的要约从客观去看是不失为减少损失的有效方法。那么，受害方不合理的拒绝毁约方的新要约会构成没有合理减少损失的行为，其日后的损害赔偿请求也会被相应限制。

6.1 受害方应否接受新要约在个人服务合约或商业合约的不同对待

受害方是否要去接受毁约方的新要约？这要从两个方面去考虑：第一个就是商业合约，一般来说，这种情况下应尽量去接受该新要约以减少损失；第二个方面是个人服务合约，由于涉及了感情上的因素，所以受害方接受新要约与否的合理性会有更大程度的宽松。这方面可先去节录在Payzu v. Saunders（1919）2 K. B. 581，McCardie大法官所说：“I felt no inclination to allow in a mercantile dispute an unhappy indulgence in far-fetched

resentment or an undue sensitiveness to slights or unfortunately worded letters. Business often

gives rise to certain asperities.”另在上诉庭，Scrutton大法官也说了同样的话：““In certain

cases of personal service it may be unreasonable to expect a plaintiff to consider an offer from

the other party who has grossly injured him；In commercial contracts, it is generally

reasonable to accept an offer from the party in default. However, it is always a question of

fact.”

另去节录Bankes大法官针对个人服务合约的新要约，他在Payzu v. Saunders有以下的话：

“There may be cases where as matter of fact it would be unreasonable to expect a

plaintiff to consider any offer made in view of the treatment he has received from the

defendant. If he had been rendering personal services and had been dismissed after being

accused in presence of others of being a thief，and if after that his employer had offered to

take him back into his service，most persons would think he was justified in refusing the

offer，and that it would be unreasonable to ask him in this way to mitigate the damages in an

action for wrongful dismissal. ”

6.2 个人服务合约

个人服务合约由于涉及了个人的尊严与感受，所以作为受害方应否去接受毁约方的新要约，合理与否就要去加上了这些因素，即使这些因素有时候是很主观的。这与商业合约有所不同，基本上只是为了金钱。但在大原则，个人服务合约还是要去看受害人有否合理减少损失，顶多是对合理程度的要求比较低。这种案例大量存在于雇佣合约，毕竟劳资纠纷是经常会有的。以下介绍的案例是涉及了雇主无理或错误解雇雇员，但事后作出新要约表示愿意去重新雇用。

首先去简单介绍有关受害方雇员没有去合理减少损失的先例。在Brace v. Calder（1895）2 Q. B. 253先例，案情涉及了4位被告合伙经营一间公司，他们与原告签约2年让他负责公司的业务管理。2年雇佣期届满前，其中2位合伙人退出并且令公司解散，但另2位合伙人又重组了公司继续经营业务。结果原告声称由于原公司解散造成其雇佣合约的终断，他要求索赔他在余下雇佣期本可挣取的工资收入。实际上当时余下的2位合伙人曾向原告提出依照原合约、原条件继续聘用他，但原告拒绝了。上诉庭判定雇佣合约确是被告不当终断，但责任虽然明确，在损失方面原告仅可获得象征性赔偿。因为他本应合理接受余下的合伙人提出的继续聘用，本可把损失减少至零。

但有更多的先例是尊重与考虑受害方雇员的尊严与感受。比如雇员是在一种屈辱的情况下被解雇的，那么考虑到他先前所遭受到的待遇，再要求他接受雇主的重新聘用是不合理的。如果一个雇员被雇主当众斥责为“内鬼”、“窃贼”后遭到不当解雇，之后雇主又提出聘回他，那么该雇员拒绝受聘也是完全正当的。因为若要求他以这种方式去减少因非法解雇而蒙受的损失，显然并不合理。这方面的先例在英国、美国、加拿大等普通法国家都有不少：Yetton v. Eastwoods Froy (1967) 1 WLR 104 (QB)；Robertson v. Wing

(1978) 95 DLR (3d) 424 (BCSC)； Allison v. Amoco Production Co (1975) 58 DLR (3d) 233

(Alta SCTD)；O‘Grady v. Ins Corp of British Columbia (1975) 63 DLR (3d) 370 (BCSC)；Thiessen v. Leduc (1975) 4 WWR 387 (Alta SC)；Washer v British Columbia Toll Highways

& Bridges Authority (1965) 53 DLR (2d) 620 (BCCA)；Herrschaft v. Vancouver Community

College (1978) 91 Dlr (3d) 328 (BCSC)。

如果新要约涉及了去要求受害方雇员与他以前吵过架的同事一起工作，也会被视为是可以不接受：Shindler v. Northern Raincoat Co (1960) 1 WLR 1038。

另是，如果要求受害方雇员放弃他的一些权利，例如对毁约方雇主叫在前的不合理解雇，这种新要约也是可以不接受：Shindler v. Northern Raincoat Co (1960) 1 WLR 1038；Washer v British Columbia Toll Highways & Bridges Authority (1965) 53 DLR (2d) 620

(BCCA)；Campbell v. MacMillan Bloedel Ltd (1978) 2 WWR 686 (BCSC)。

在以上谈的是雇佣合约，但估计把受害方的感受加以作为合理与否的考虑，也会出现在其他类别的案件，即使这些案件不严格属于个人服务。例如，在一个长期的商业合约被毁约终断后，受害方对毁约方的新要约不予接受，就可能涉及了个人的感受，例如是否对毁约方继续履行合约有信心。如果受害方说得出一个有板有眼的理由，这会是可以作为合理与否去减少损失的反驳。但也会有不太令人信服的理由，例如，受害方指称毁约方是一家经济实力不强的公司，甚至是一家巴拿马公司，所以没有信心。但这个情况是在受害方与毁约方订立原合约的时候就存在。所以，受害方的这个借口看来并不太合理。说到底，合理与否都是在法院与仲裁庭的一念之间。

笔者估计，另一种有可能在一定程度涉及受害方感受的就是在Udale v. Bloomsbury

Area Health Authority (1983) 1 WLR 1098和Emeh v. Kensington & Chelsea &

Westminster Area Health Authority (1985) QB 1012之后带来一连串同类的先例。这种本质上是属于侵权的先例涉及了医生进行绝育手术，但手术失误，导致病人受孕所带来的损失计算。例如在Udale v. Bloomsbury Area Health Authority，涉及了一位已经有3个小孩的母亲进行绝育手术后再度怀孕。这种案例涉及的损失计算是将来把该不想要的孩子养大与提供教育的所有费用，直到他能够自立为止。正如在Allen v. Bloomsbury

Area Health Authority (1993) 1 All ER 651，Brooke大法官所说：

“in this type of case defendants are liable to pay for all such expenses as may be

reasonably incurred for the education and upkeep for the unplanned child, to his condition

in life and his reasonable requirements at the time the expenditure is incurred.”

显然，这样计算损失是一笔很大的钱。所以，当地医管局作为被告通常会提出的抗辩试图去减少金钱赔偿就是受害方应该接受堕胎，否则是没有合理减少损失。这一来，被告即使是要承担疏忽的责任，也只是要赔偿有限的堕胎费用。但有关的先例是一直否定受害方拒绝堕胎有任何不合理，这里涉及了堕胎毕竟还有一定程度的风险并会给受害方带来痛楚与不适。但估计也是去照顾了受害方不愿意接受堕胎的个人感受。在Allen v.

Bloomsbury Area Health Authority先例中是说：“the defendant…did not try to contend that

(the plaintiff) had acted unreasonably in deciding not to have a termination.”（被告没有试图去争辩原告拒绝接受堕胎是不合理的。）

还有其他估计涉及了受害方感受的有关案件，可以举一个先例R v. Blaue (1975) 1

WLR 1411 (CA)。案情涉及了受害方因宗教的原因拒绝输血而频临死亡，被侵权方指称没有去合理减少损失，但这不被法院接受。

6.3 商业合约

在大原则上，商业合约一般是要求受害方更谨慎去考虑毁约方的新要约，特别这是能够解决当时的困难或减少损失。已经是提到过，商业合约不应该涉及感情用事，或是个人尊严。这一点对部分亚洲人或中国人来说会有点说不通，例如笔者经常听到一些商业人士说：“我不是为了钱，我是为了原则！”笔者就有过经历就是中方当事人对西方人重复了几次这一个说法，直到西方人回应说：“你把我们争议的1千万美元支付给我，我就向你道歉说完全是我错了。”中方当事人无法回应，但也没有接受。所以说到底还

是为了钱，在商业活动中没有什么原则不原则的。

如果受害方没有一个说得过去的理由就拒绝毁约方的新要约，就会有危险。这尤其是在一次过的买卖合约。比如毁约的卖方拒绝以原合约条件或价格交货，或毁约的买方拒绝接受交货，但同时又提出以其他条件或价格交货或收货。若根据客观情况判断，受害方当时拒绝这项新要约是不合理的，那他日后的索赔金额就会打折扣了。已多次提及的重要先例Payzu v. Saunders（1919）2 K. B. 581就是这样一种情况，被告卖方与原告买方签订有关的买卖合约，分9个月交货。付款为赊购方式，原告可以每期交货后一个月内支付货款。第一期付款由于支票开晚了作出支付，被告以此为由终断了合约，但法院认为是被告毁约。但被告曾经在同时提出订立新合约继续向原告供货，建议的新合约除了付款改为交货即付（原告作为买方在收货时立即支付货款）之外，其余条文并无改变。但原告拒绝接受，等于是拒绝了被告的新要约。当时市场价格一路上涨，原告向被告索赔市场价格与原合约价格的差价。法院判定原告本应接受被告签订新合约的建议，并认定是善意的（bona fide）新要约，虽然是付款方式改为交货即付，但原合约价格毕竟维持不变，这样他本可以避免支付市场的差价，从而减少损失。因此，原告只能索赔回他如果可以每期赊付但变为是交货即付所带来的利息损失，也就是他若接受被告合理作出新要约仍会蒙受的损失。

已经提过，法官在判决时提出，在商业合约方面，要求受害方接受毁约方的新要约通常并没有什么不合理。对此我们要引起重视，因为实务中不时会遇到这种情况。比如航次租约中承租人因为备货、买卖合约等出问题，造成原来约定的租约运输无货可装，变了是非要毁约不可。而他或他的联营公司在装港或附近港口有另一批货物可付运，那么他就会一方面告诉船东原租约运输的货物已落空（通常船东就会被迫接受承租人毁约），另一方面向船东提出新要约就是另一个替代的航次。这时船东都应以平和的心态去加以合理考虑，最好不要断然拒绝。如果船东当时还有其他市场上的替代租约可供选择，利润与好处（这会包括很多方面，例如卸货地点）不下于毁约的承租人的替代航次，船东还可以硬得起来。但是若是不幸揽不到其他生意，船东断然拒绝承租人的新要约就有危险了，可能日后会被认定没有合理接受承租人的新要约以减少损失，令损失赔偿受到限制。

6.3.1 新要约的条件必须合理

在著名Payzu v. Saunders（1919）2 K. B. 581先例的一审，McCardie大法官说：

“I feel no inclination to allow in a mercantile dispute an unhappy indulgence in

farfetched resentment or an undue sensitiveness to slights or unfortunately worded letters.

Business often gives rise to certain asperities. But I agree that the plaintiffs in deciding

whether to accept the defendant‘s offer were fully entitled to consider the terms in which the

offer was made，its. bona fides or otherwise，its relation to their own business methods and

financial position，and all the circumstances of the case；and it must be remembered that an

acceptance of the offer would not preclude an action for damages for the actual loss

sustained. ‖（以上的第二句话就说到原告决定是否接受被告的新要约时，完全有权去考虑新要约的条件、是否有诚意或其他方面，特别是关系到原告自己的生意模式与经济状况[例如，在该先例把支付条件改为交货即付会否导致原告资金流通的困难]。同时，必须要记得新要约不能去要求受害方放弃已造成的实际损失的索赔。）

根据这一个说法，就可以去举一个例子是被告同意以10美元每吨的价格卖给原告，但在市场上涨到12美元每吨时，被告拒绝交货并构成毁约。但被告随即作出新要约以11美元每吨的价格卖给原告，并说明这是原合约的全面与最后的和解（full and final

settlement）。在这种情况下，原告拒绝该新要约是不属于没有合理减少损失。但如果被告作出新要约是同样以以11美元每吨的价格卖给原告，但说明这是不损害原告索赔他的损失（也就是比原来合约价格多付了1美元）。原告还是拒绝接受，并没有其他合理的原因去解释此行为，就有危险被视为是没有合理减少损失。

这方面还可以去举另一个先例Heaven & Kesterton Ltd v. Establishment Francois

Albias & Cie (1956) 2 Lloyd‘s Rep 316 (QB)。该先例涉及了买方对一批货物（木材）因货不对版而拒货，卖方同意减价要求买方收货，但买方仍然拒绝。在后来的仲裁，仲裁庭判买方拒绝卖方的新要约是没有合理减少损失。但这被上诉的法院推翻，认为拒绝新要约是合理，并说买方如果必须接受减价的新要约，就等于去剥夺买方因货不对版可以拒货的权利。Devlin大法官是这样说：

“What, in effect, the arbitrator is saying is: ‗From a business point of view‘ – if I may

put it that way – ‗you could very well have taken up these goods and suffered no business

disadvantage, providing you were given an allowance of ￡1 per standard for the defects in

quality.‘ Of course, that is tantamount to depriving a buyer of his right to reject altogether, and

saying that, notwithstanding that he is properly rejecting, he is to be put in precisely the same

position as if he had taken up the goods, and as if his only remedy was to be compensated for

the damage on the basis of defective quality.”

但看来如果不涉及货物质量的问题，而是其他理由终断买卖合约，例如是在一个CIF买卖，卖方晚了把货物付运或者是交出的付运文件有不符点（这是会导致无法结汇信用证），情况就有不同。估计是涉及货物质量要求受害方接受减价作为和解，就是要求受害方放弃他的权利。但如果是涉及非货物质量而导致买卖合约终断的情况，就没有要求受害方放弃他任何的权利。正如Devlin大法官所说（这段话在本章第4段已节录过）：