损失的遥远性(英国合同法)

 损失的遥远性

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在谈到损失的遥远性（remoteness of damages），最重要的一个方面就是针对一些合理预见（reasonably foreseeable或within reasonable contemplation）与不可预见的损失。这一个大原则适用在侵权与合约，虽然在合约方面，有说法是The

“Achilleas”（2007）1 Lloyd‟s Rep. 19带来了一些改变，变了不是预见与否，而是双方订约时假设去接受的责任（assumption of responsibility），这变成是双方所订的合约中去明示或默示看有否对某一种类型的损失有去考虑到，并且违约方是否愿意去承担后果。换言之，针对无辜方可以在正常情况下向违约方索赔或取回的损失类别是有所收紧的。

这里要去区分损失，并不让无辜方可以向违约方全部取回的合理性是如果要违约方承担所有的损失，不论是否可以预见（甚至在双方谈判合约的时候，如果把这种损失提出来要求违约方去承担，将要承担风险的一方会有可能拒绝订约），是太苛刻的，甚至是不公平的。这里可以去举几个日常与假设的例子，第一个是笔者在儿子小时候用来讲道理时候所用的例子，这就是一个乘客与一个出租车司机（或公司）约好第二天清早接他去机场。但第二天清早由于出租车司机睡过头爽约，原告因此误了班机，丧失了一宗大生意达1千万美元。那么司机是否要去赔偿这一千万美元呢？旁观的第三者马上会感到，要该司机赔这么大一笔钱有不妥、不公平之处。但能去说得出什么法理上站的住脚的抗辩吗？第一个想的到的就是该乘客在过了约定时间之后没有看到出租车，为什么不去另外一辆出租车去机场？或是，早一班飞机赶不上就赶下一班飞机？这是涉及减少损失（mitigation）方面，本书另章会谈。但在这里就可以去假设没有这一减损的合理机会，因为乘客住的地方很荒僻，清早根本无法到其他的出租车。另外，飞机去的目的地是一个班机不多的地方，错过了清早这一班飞机就要等多几天才有班机，这一笔大生意就错过了。第二个想到的就是出租车司机不知道乘客原来有这么重要的事情要办，如果乘客早告诉他这一事实，他就会有不同做法。例如在早一天的晚上就在乘客的家门外等待，就绝对不会爽约。甚至，如果这是一个比较正规的租车合约，出租车司机会去加上条文限制违约下的赔偿责任或是去提高租车费。如果这样就公道一点的话就假设在这个例子内，乘客在订车的时候的确是有电话里提到接他去机场非常重要因为他赶着去签一个重要的合约，并承诺会给出租车司机多一点小费。这一来，假设乘客能够证明这些事实，是否足够妥善与公平要出租车司机去承担这1千万美元的损失呢？会否，该乘客还要更清楚说明如果出租车司机毁约的后果将会是面对1千万美元的索赔，并说明多一点小费是多少钱（如果没有说明小费多少或是只承诺给10元的区区小数，就会与承诺1万美元的小费，显然是有所不同），然后让出租车司机值不值得冒这个险来接为什么针对合约损失需要有遥远性的局限？

这个生意？看来，法律这一刀切在什么地方并不是一件容易的事情。

香港高院Reyes大法官在2008年2月给香港大学的发言《Certainty in Contractual

Damages Assessment – On Two Suggested Alternatives to the Rule in Hadley v.

Baxendale》中也举到一个例子可以在这里一提，这是从英国一首童谣引出来的：

“For want of a nail the shoe was lost, for want of a shoe the horse was lost, for want

of a horse the rider was lost, for want of a rider the battle was lost, for want of a battle

the kingdom was lost, and all for the want of a horseshoe nail.”。

假设在国王和铁匠之间有一个以100美元来提供马蹄钉的合约，在合约的谈判过程中，国王提到这个钉子是用在他的马匹上，而他即将骑这匹马去参加一场战役。国王声称这个钉子必须拥有最顶级的质量否则他就会战败亡国。而铁匠以为国王只是说笑而没有提出任何条文去免除交付时钉子有缺陷的责任，也没有去要求更高的报酬。结果，铁匠交付出的钉子质量上有缺陷，最终导致国王在战役中因为马失前蹄战败。在这种情况下，可不可以说铁匠要为国王战败与亡国的后果负责呢？换句话说，在与国王的谈判过程中，铁匠是不是要为了区区100美元的收入承担国王战败与亡国的责任呢？

这个例子是极端的，但它引起了人的疑问：合理的可预见性或者其他类似的测试可否作为限制合约赔偿的原则呢？这会否对订约双方更加公平？

2 Hadley v. Baxendale先例的损失规定

显然，对于这种无法合理估计到的后果是应该有一个地方来一刀切断。这里就要介绍一个英国最著名的、在诉讼中被引用最多的一个先例Hadley v. Baxendale

(1854) 9 Ex. 341，它就损失合理预见性问题确立了一套基本的理论，称为其后这方面判例的一个总体指南。该案情是：原告的工厂因蒸汽机曲轴断裂造成停产，原告急忙委托被告船东将断轴运送给某地的厂家供其依样再做一根新的。结果被告违约（海上运输合约）延迟了交付，造成新轴比原计划晚了好几天才交到原告厂里。为此，原告向被告索赔若没有这几天延迟工厂本可早点复工而挣取到的生产利润。法院判定：延迟交送断轴给制造厂家造成原告工厂停产的损失是被告无法合理预见的，被告订约当时的全部认识就是为原告工厂这一条断轴运输，他并不知道原告没有任何备用轴可供应急，更不知道延误会带来停产。结果原告败诉。道理其实也很简单，虽然船东确实是违约延迟了交货，比如是船舶不合理绕航或不适航等，但所运的断轴仅仅是一个零件。以通常合理的眼光看，原告工厂晚了拿到新的零件损失了什么呢？船东哪里晓得原告没有备用的应急，以致弄到整个工厂停产这么严重。如果所有损失都给索赔回来，工厂停产，那可不得了啊。产

值利润没了，工人没公开，收入没了，说不定家计都成了问题。这些都要船东来赔？船东肯定跳起来了，说：“你怎么不早讲这些后果啊！如果你订约当时就告诉我，这个断轴一定要某月某日前运抵，务必准时，否则整个工厂就开不了工，要倒闭，那我肯定不运了。即使运的话，我也会收很高的运费，因为责任太大了嘛！”这是一个很早的案子了，如果是现在的案子，船东可能还会说：“你要早讲明后果，运费贵了一点我也会运，不过就不是现在这个运法了。一旦半途船遇到什么麻烦，可能造成延迟的话，我就会马上设法把断轴转到岸上交飞机空运到目的地，以确保准时。而现在你事后才告诉我损失这么多，这怎么行呢？”

这个案子判下来后，有关违约损害赔偿的判定就有了一个按违约方能否合理预见作为标准把损失分为两种类别的做法，或称为两条规则。一种是“一般损失”（ordinary damages），或毁约会造成的自然与一般性后果，违约方要赔；另一种是“特别损失”（special damages），或称非一般后果，违约方不用赔，除非订约当时或之前受害方已将特别后果告诉了违约方。其中，法院的判决如下：

“We think the proper rule in such a case as the present is this: where two parties have

made a contract which one of them has broken, the damages which the other party

ought to receive in respect of such breach of contract should be such as may fairly and

reasonably be considered either arising naturally, i.e. accordingly to the usual course

of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed

to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract,

as the probable result of the breach of it. Now, if the special circumstances under

which the contract was actually made were communicated by the plaintiffs to the

defendants and thus known to both parties, the damages resulting from the breach of

such a contract, which they would reasonably contemplate, would be the amount of

injury which would ordinarily follow from a breach of contract under these special

circumstances so known and communicated. But, on the other hand, if these special

circumstances were wholly unknown to the party breaking the contract, he, at the

most, would only be supposed to have had in his contemplation the amount of injury

which would arise generally, and in the great multitude of cases not affected by any

special circumstances, from such a breach of contract. For, had the special

circumstances been known, the parties might have specially provided for the breach

of contract by special terms as to the damages in that case; and of this advantage it

would be very unjust to deprive them. Now the above principles are those by which

we think the jury ought to be guided in estimating the damages arising out of any

breach of contract.”

对这一个重要先例的理解，可去节录Goff大法官在The “Pegase” (1981) 1 Lloyd‟s

Rep 175的有关判词：

“This statement of principle was at one time widely understood to embrace two

“rules”, the first rule being concerned with the recovery of damages arising naturally,

i.e., according to the usual course of things, and the second rule being concerned with

recovery of damages within the contemplation of the parties at the time when the

contract was made. Furthermore, the application of the second rule was understood

to be dependant upon knowledge of special circumstances which had not merely been

communicated by the plaintiff to the defendant at or before the time when the contract

was made (a requirement which is consistent with one reading of the succeeding

passage in Baron Alderson‟s judgment), but had been so communicated that the

defendant, by entering into the contract, assented expressly or impliedly to assuming

the risk of loss flowing from such special circumstances.”

接下去就有不少先例根据Hadley v. Baxendale的损失规定去作出判决，看看损失类别到底是属于一般损失或特别损失。其中，被判是特别损失的类别，在订约时受害方没有预先作出通知，是不能去索赔的，包括有：针对承运人，分销合约的利润损失不能去索赔的先例有：Wilson v. The Lancashire & Yorkshire Railway

(1861) 9 CB (NS) 632；O‟ Hanlan v. The Great Western Railway (1865) 12 LT 490；Great Western Railway Co. v. Redmayne (1866) LR 1 CP 329；Horne v. Midland

Railway (1873) LR 8 CP 131；The “Arpad” (1934) 49 Lloyd‟s Rep 313；Heskell v.

Continental Express Ltd. (1950) 83 Lloyd‟s Rep 438。针对货物的生产损失或利润不能去索赔的先例有：Hadley v. Baxendale；Gee v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Railway

(1860) 6 H&N 211；British Columbia Saw Mill Co. v. Nettleship (1868) LR 3 CP

499。看来这些案件主要是针对货物买卖与货物运输，特别是海上运输，这也是当年最主要的商业活动。

但在Hadley v. Baxendale之后，普通法还是有进一步的发展。第一方面是通过Victoria Laundry v. Newman Industries (1949) 2 K.B. 528与The “Heron II ” (1967)

2 Lloyd‟s Rep 457这两个贵族院先例去进一步给了解读。其中在Victoria Laundry就带来了说法就是双方在订立合约的时候，如果将来发生违约/毁约，哪些损失种类是可以去推定双方知情（imputed knowledge）。在The “Heron II ”，认为更好的测试办法是去看将来发生违约/毁约，哪些损失是双方在订约时是可以料想得到的（within contemplation）且并非是不可能（not unlikely）会产生，或者很可能（serious possibility）会发生，但不需要达到极有可能（probable）的程度。有说法是“possible”是有50%以下的可能性，而“probable”则有高达90%的可能性。这变了每次去考虑损失的遥远性，只需要根据这一条规定，而在也不需要Hadley v. Baxendale的两条损失规定。

在普通法下另一方面的发展，会是在扩大被视为是双方（特别是将来的违约方）应该是可以合理料想得到的损失类别。例如是在Victoria Laundry，违约方是一家工程公司，也被视为是可以料想得到锅炉的延迟交付会导致洗衣馆的正常利润的损失。另在The “Heron II”，违约方船东被视为是知道货物目的地港巴斯拉是有一个市场，船舶延误会带来市场下跌的可能性。可以说随着通讯发达与一般人知识面的不断扩大，所以估计去认定在订约时双方应该可以合理料想得到的事情包括违约会造成什么损失也不断放宽。

以下我们将上述的简单介绍去进一步地解释。

3 Victoria Laundry先例的进一步解读

这一个Hadley v. Baxendale的损失规定在先例Victoria Laundry v. Newman

Industries (1949) 2 K.B. 528的上诉庭有了进一步的解读。案情涉及了原告洗衣馆向被告工程公司订购了一个锅炉，被告迟交货达5个月之久，原告诉称被告若按期交货，原告除了因使用锅炉可赚取正常利润之外，还应可获得并完成几项来自政府方面的合约，挣取极高额的利润，因此，被告要赔偿所有这些盈利损失。法庭判定被告在订约前已知晓原告是从事洗衣、印染行业，而且该锅炉是原告急待投入使用以扩大业务量的。因此对原告本可赚取的正常利润的丧失，被告必须赔偿，因这是他在订约当时可以合理预见的一般损失。至于那几份获利奇高合约的盈利损失，则被告无须负责。因为在被告没有特别知会的情况下，被告不可能预见到原告会有这么值钱的几份合约在手。这些合约本可带来的异常利润的丧失客观上对被告来说，是遥不可及的特别损失。

从这个判例，我们可以再次看到，要判定某种损失可否合理预见与是否特别，受害方（被违约方）能否获赔，关键就是要看订约时违约方能否合理预见到（reasonably foreseeable）他一旦违约，就很有可能会导致某种类损失。如果能预见到，那么这种损失就是一般损失，违约方必须赔偿，反之则是不可合理预见的特别损失，违约方无须负责。

Victoria Laundry先例实是对Hadley v. Baxendale的两条损失规定加以分析，然后去列出著名的六项大原则，如下（英文）：

（1） It is well settled that the governing purpose of damages is to put the party

whose rights have been violated in the same position, so far as money can do so, as if

his rights had been observed: Sally Wertheim v. Chicoutimi Pulp Co.(1911) A. C. 301.

This purpose, if relentlessly, pursued, would provide him with a complete indemnity

for all lose de facto resulting from a particular breach, however improbable, however

unpredictable. This, in contract at least, is recognized as too harsh a rule. Hence, （这里指出受害方如果可以向违约方索赔全部损失，包括一些极不可能与估计不到的损失，会带来很苛刻的后果。）

（2） In cases of breach of contract the aggrieved party is only entitled to recover

such part of the loss actually resulting as was at the time of the contract reasonably

foreseeable as liable to result from the breach.（如果违约，受害方只能去索赔与取回在订约时可以合理预见的由于违约带来的损失部分）

（3） What was at that time reasonably so foreseeable depends on the knowledge then

possessed by the parties or, at all events, by the party who later commits the breach.

（什么是在订约时可以合理预见，是要根据订约双方当时应该知道的。这表示对合理预见性的测试，还要看后来变为是违约方在订约时合理应该对什么知情。例如在Hadley v. Baxendale先例，船东不是搞工厂，所以通常不知道工厂是否有该轴的备件，也不会知道工厂会因为缺少这个轴而导致停产。）

（4） For this purpose, knowledge “possessed” is of two kinds; one imputed, the

other actual. Everyone, as a reasonable person, is taken to know the “ordinary course

of things” and consequently what loss is liable to result from a breach of contract in

that ordinary course. This is the subject matter of the “first rule” in Hadley v.

Baxendale…But to this knowledge which a contract–breaker is assumed to possess

whether possesses it or not, there may have to be added in a particular case knowledge

which he actually possesses, of special circumstances outside the “ordinary course of

things” of such a kind that a breach in those special circumstances would be liable to

cause more loss. Such a case attracts the operation of the “second rule” so as to make

additional loss also recoverable.（违约方在订约时应该知情的情况分为两种，第一种是推定知情，第二种是真正知情。第一种是去假设一般人士或在该合约有关行业的人士都应该知道，这是轮不到违约方去抗辩说他实际上是不知道，因为念书少或是愚蠢、无知不是抗辩理由。第二种真正知情是违约方真正知道的，这通常是由受害方去通知。去出违约方是否真正知道，是一个事实的认定。这真正知情与推定知情不一样的地方就是前者不是一般人士或在该合约有关行业的人士应该知道。这真正知情就会导致适用Hadley v. Baxendale的第二条规则，也就是让受害方可去索赔特别损失的额外损失。）

（5） In order to make the contract–breaker liable under either rule it is not necessary

that he should actually have asked himself what loss is liable to result from a breach.

As has often been pointed out, parties at the time of contracting contemplate not the

breach of the contract, but its performance. It suffices that, if he had considered the

question, he would as a reasonable man have concluded that the loss in question was

liable to result…（去出违约方是否对一般损失或特别损失负责，是不必去考虑他到底是否知道违约会带来什么损失。这是因为在订约时，双方只会考虑到如何履行与赚钱，不会去想违约/毁约带来的后果。但只要是去假设在订约时，如果被问及，违约方作为一个合理的人士应该料想到某些损失会有可能或很可能产生就已经足够了。）

（6） Nor, finally, to make a particular loss recoverable, need it be proved that upon a

given state of knowledge the defendant could, as a reasonable man, foresee that a

breach must necessarily result in that loss. It is enough if he could foresee it was

likely so to result. It is indeed enough, …if the loss (or some factor without which it

would not have occurred) is a “serious possibility” or a “real danger”. For short, we

have used the word “liable” to result. Possibly the colloquialism „on the cards‟

indicates the shade of meaning with some approach to accuracy. （只要能够证明违约方在订约时能够预见到某种损失有可能或很有可能会发生，即要对损失负责，而不必要预见到这种损失一定会发生。）

3.1 什么是推定知情（imputed knowledge）

现在去进一步解释什么是推定知情，在Hadley v. Baxendale先例中，违约方的推定知情是要对第一种的一般损失负责。去认定违约方在订约时什么是应该知道或不知道是要根据每个案件的事实去分析。但总的来说，是根据三个因素去作出认定。第一个是订约双方（特别是原告受害方的）的行业与专业。所以，有不少先例判是业务的损失或者转售利润的损失类别，针对有关货物的卖方与运载该货物的承运人是有不同的判法。显然，前者卖方是行业内的人士，他应该知道得更多。这在The “Heron II ” (1967) 2 Lloyd‟s Rep 457先例中，Upjohn勋爵也说：“a carrier

of goods…is not carrying on the same trade as the consignor of goods and his

knowledge of the practices and exigencies of the other‟s trade may be limited and less

than between buyer and seller of goods who probably know far more about one

another‟s business.”

另一个涉及了土地/房子买卖的先例是Diamond v. Compbell-Jones (1961) Ch 22，案情涉及了买方向毁约的卖方索赔损失，损失是包括了他预期可以赚取的利润，因为他向卖方买的位于伦敦的房子是计划去把它们重新装修然后作为住宅与办公楼之用。Buckley大法官只判毁约方去赔偿房子的市场价格减去合约价格的差价，认为毁约方通常不会知道受害方的业务与有什么打算，除非订约前已被通知。他是这样说：

“I cannot believe that Lord Wright，in … the Monarch Steamship Co v. A/B

Karlshamns Oljefabriker (1940) 82 Lloyd‟s Rep.137 meant that anyone entering into a

contract must be treated as having constructive notice of the nature of the other party‟s

business, or of its probable bearing on the loss which that other party might suffer in

consequence of a breach of contract. In some cases the nature or the subject-matter of

a contract or of its terms may be such as to make it clear that one of the parties is

entering into the contract for the purpose of a particular business, and the

circumstances may be such that the court will infer that the other party must have

appreciated that this was so. It seems to me, however, that this can rarely be the case

where the contract is for the sale of land. The vendor of a ship equipped for use as a

butcher‟s shop would not, in my judgment, be justified by that circumstance alone in

assuming, and ought not to be treated as knowing, that the purchaser would intend to

use it for the business of a butcher rather than that of a baker or candlestick-maker, at

any rate in the absence of covenants or other forms of restriction confining its use to

butcher‟s business. Special circumstances are necessary to justify imputing to a

vendor of land a knowledge that the purchaser intends to use it in any particular

manner.”

有说法是一个简单的行业可以去推断违约方有更多的知情，而一个复杂的行业就会是违约方不会有太多的知情。这是Juancey勋爵在The “Heron II”先例说的：

“It must always be a question of circumstances what one contracting party is

presumed to know about the business activities of the other. No doubt the simpler

the activity of the one, the more readily can it be inferred that the other would have

reasonable knowledge thereof. However, when the activity of A involves

complicated construction or manufacturing techniques, I see no reason why B who

supplies a commodity which A intends to use in the course of those technique should

be assumed, merely because of the order for the commodity, to be award of the details

of all the techniques undertaken by A and the effect thereupon of any failure of or

deficiency in that commodity. Even if the Lord Ordinary had made a positive

finding that continuous pouring was a required part of industrial practice it would not

follow that in the absence of any other evidence suppliers of electricity…should have

been award of that practice.”

另有可能根据有关货物能去推定违约方有更多或更少的知情，其中在涉及了整批货物例如是一台完整的机器，相比只是一些零件，就可以作出不同程度的推定（例如针对利润损失）。这是Asquith大法官在Victoria Laundry先例中所说：

“Significance in so far as it bears on the capacity of the supplier to foresee the

consequence of non-delivery.”

针对市场的涨跌会造成的损失，这通常被视为是双方在订约时可以去推定知情。Parker大法官在Interoffice Telephones v. Freeman (1958) 1 QB 190说：

“Whether it be a hiring agreement or a contract for the sale of goods, where the

purchaser has failed to take delivery, the defaulting party must contemplate that

damages will vary according to the state of the market, including questions of supply

and demand.”

3.2 什么是真正知情（actual knowledge）

3.2.1

如果要违约方承担某一种类别的特别损失，就必须认定他在订约的时候有真正的知情。如果在订约后才有真正的知情，例如受害方向违约方在违约之前作出通知，这是不管用的。虽然，曾经有一个古老的先例名为Gee v. Lancashire & Yorkshire

Railway (1860) 6 H&N 211说受害方可以对违约方在违约之前声明：“If you, after

that notice, persist in breaking the contract, I shall claim the damages which will

result from the breach.”，就会导致违约方要去承担特别损失。但这一个说法是错误，这方面请看《McGregor on Damages》17版6-174段。笔者看来，这显然是正确的，否则潜在的受害方可以留待合约一订立就马上通知对方有关一切违约会产生的特别损失，严重的程度是对方（潜在的违约方）从来没想过去接受的。但由于合约已经订立，对方也没有退出或改变合约（例如去加上责任限制条文）的余地，这岂非是开玩笑。

3.2.2

更复杂的情况是如果受害方在订约时把有关的特别情况告诉违约方，并且是足够去保障将来对特别损失的索赔。例如买方告诉卖方他这票货已经转卖，这是否是足够去增加卖方的赔偿责任？看来，这么简单的通知不像有什么作用，在国际买卖中，不少的商品或货物都会在海上运输期间转卖，不必通知也可以推定知情。这个问题在Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 9 Ex. 341先例之后的好几个先例都有涉及，第一个是British Columbia Saw Mill Co. v. Nettleship (1868) LR 3 CP 499，Willes大法官说光是知道有关的特别情况并不足够，而是要受害方在订约的时候可以合理相信违约方是接受了这一个特别情况下订约的。毕竟，知情可以是来自第三人的通知，但这并不足够。知情必须是受害方与违约方之间合约的一部分，订约前作出通知有关特别情况怎样才算是足够

订约后才作出通知有关特别情况

显示了违约方愿意接受这一个赔偿责任。Willes大法官是这样说：“The mere fact

of knowledge cannot increase the liability. The knowledge must be brought home to

the party sought to be charged, under such circumstances that he must know that the

person he contracts with reasonably believes that he accepts the contract with the

special condition attached to it … Knowledge on the part of the carrier is only

important if it forms part of the contract. It may be that the knowledge is acquired

casually from a stranger, the person to whom the goods belong not knowing or caring

whether he had such knowledge or not…”

但接下去在The “Heron II ” (1967) 2 Lloyd‟s Rep 457，Upjohn勋爵明确表示不同意，认为双方在知道一些特别情况下去订立合约，就可以合理假设为双方有料想到违约/毁约会带来的后果，不需要再去以合约条文明示或默示去同意这种特别情况说明。Upjohn勋爵说：“If parties enter into the contract with knowledge of some

special circumstances, and it is reasonable to infer a particular loss as a result of those

circumstances that is something which both must contemplate as a result of a breach.

It is quite unnecessary that it should be a term of the contract.”

这方面的发展等于是对特别损失所需要的通知有所放宽，这可以去节录Goff大法官在The “Pagase” (1981) 1 Lloyd‟s Rep. 175所讲的如下：“The second

development (这是指Hadley v. Baxendale之后针对这一方面的法律调整) has been

a loosening of the rule, stated in earlier cases (of which British Columbia Saw Mill Co.

v. Nettleship is a typical example) that knowledge by the defendant of special

circumstances is only relevant if so communicated to him (这是指违约方) that he, by

entering into the contract, assented expressly or impliedly to assume the risk of loss

flowing from such special circumstances. Indeed, in The „Heron II‟, Lord Upjohn

expressly dissented from the proposition that liability for damages resulting from

special circumstances must be made a term of the contract. … In the light of the

decided cases, the test appears to be: have the facts in question come to the

defendant‟s knowledge in such circumstances that a reasonable person in the shoes of

the defendant would, if he had considered the matter at the time of making the

contract, have contemplated that, in the event of a breach by him, such facts were to

be taken into account when considering of his responsibility for loss suffered by the

plaintiff as a result of such breach. The answer to that question may vary from case to

case, taking into consideration matters as, for example, the nature of the facts in

question and how far they are unusual, and the extent to which such facts are likely to

make fulfilment of the contract by the due date more critical, or to render the

plaintiff‟s loss heavier in the event of non-fulfilment.”。

对特殊情况的通知，合理之处就是被告违约方永远可以说是他根本不准备去接受这种特别损失的赔偿风险，如果受害方在订约前告诉他的话。这种没有作出通知或足够通知导致被告成功抗拒赔偿特别损失的先例也不少。针对承运人，分销合约的利润损失不能去索赔的先例有：Wilson v. The Lancashire & Yorkshire Railway

(1861) 9 CB (NS) 632；O‟ Hanlan v. The Great Western Railway (1865) 12 LT 490；Great Western Railway Co. v. Redmayne (1866) LR 1 CP 329；Horne v. Midland

Railway (1873) LR 8 CP 131；The “Arpad” (1934) 49 Lloyd‟s Rep 313；Heskell v.

Continental Express Ltd. (1950) 83 Lloyd‟s Rep 438。针对货物的生产损失或利润不能去索赔的先例有：Hadley v. Baxendale；Gee v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Railway

(1860) 6 H&N 211；British Columbia Saw Mill Co. v. Nettleship (1868) LR 3 CP

499。

相反，如果是特别情况在订约前通知了被告违约方，而且是在一种情况下被告是接受，或者可以视为接受有关的风险，被告就通常要负责。而这种情况可以是被告漠不关心并去订立合约，即使原告是给了足够与明确的通知。如果被告在通知后试图去在合约增加一条责任限制条文，但最后不成功的情况下订立合约，被告接受有关风险就更明确了。这也是香港高院Reyes大法官的说法，他在2008年2月给香港大学的发言《Certainty in Contractual Damages Assessment – On Two

Suggested Alternatives to the Rule in Hadley v. Baxendale》中说道：

“In other words, the Court should conclude that a promisor undertook liability for an

unusual loss if and only if the promisor expressly or impliedly agreed to do so. What

has or has not been agreed depends as always on the peculiar facts of a case. But the

Court should be able to apply the touchstone in a way that makes the Court‟s

decisions reasonably foreseeable by all.”

这两个要求（通知与视为接受）两者都需要，这是Diplock大法官在Robophone

Facilities v. Blank (1966) 1 WLR 1428所说。例如在Muhammad v. Ali (1947) AC

414，Trans Trust SPRL v. Danubian Trading Company (1952) 2 QB 297，Wadsworth

v. Lydall (1981) 1 WLR 598，这些先例都让原告成功索赔因原告缺钱而导致的损失，因为双方在订合约的时候对原告缺钱的情况是在料想之中。

3.3 真正知情可以带来更大或更少的损失

通常说，违约方在订约时对特别情况知情就要负责赔偿特别损失，都会是指更高的损失。但也有情况会因知情而导致损失的减少，例如在货物买卖中的分销或转售是双方都知情的，而且这是一个赚取很高差价的转售（估计这种情况不常见，因为买方不会希望卖方知道他的分销或转售是赚大钱的，所以不可能去作出特殊

情况的通知）。这一来，说法是卖方毁约拒绝供货的赔偿要依据这一个转售，而不是市场价格的差价。在Biggim v. Permanite (1951) 1 KB 422，Devlin大法官是这样说：

“If, however, a sub-sale is within the contemplation of the parties, I think that the

damages must be assessed by reference to it, whether the plaintiff likes it or not…If it

is the plaintiff‟s liability to the ultimate user that is contemplated as the measure of

damages and it is in fact used without injurious results so that no such liability arises,

the plaintiff could not claim the difference in market value, and say that the sub-sale

must be disregarded.”

但看来如果是一个双方在订约时都知情与作出过通知的分销或者转售，而且赚取的差价不高或甚至亏本，反正就是比毁约时的市场价格低，看来也应该在计算损失时去考虑在内，这会导致更低的赔偿金额。Pearce勋爵在The “Heron II ” (1967)

2 Lloyd‟s Rep 457是这样说：

“Of course the extension of the horizon need not always increase the damage; it

might introduce a knowledge of particular circumstances, e.g. a sub-contract, which

show that the plaintiff would in fact suffer less damage than a more limited view of

the circumstances might lead one to expect.”

这种情况也在Duncan Investment Ltd v. Underwood (1998) PNLR 754, CA出现。案情涉及了15栋房屋买卖，其中原告Duncan是地产商，而被告Underwood是估价师。原告想去从接管人的米兰银行把15栋房屋（本来是16栋，但最终有1栋没有成交）以低价一并买下，然后分别出售赚钱。在行动之前，原告委任被告去对这15栋房屋分别出售，估计在6个月内出售可以卖得的价钱。被告作出了估价，但事后才知道被告把价钱估高了。反正是原告在这笔生意上亏了大本，所以去向被告提出索赔，希望把自己的损失减低。针对损失的计算，原告认为是他从米兰银行对15栋房屋的支付价格减去把15栋房屋一并出售的差价，即148,253英镑。但被告认为是原告的支付价格减去把15栋房屋分别出售的差价，即41,190英镑。原因是一并出售与分别出售所得出的价格相差很远，是25%以上。毕竟，去分别出售的话，麻烦会增加不少。原告认为是第一种计算办法比较正确，因为这是苹果对苹果的比较。因为原告的支付价格是一并购买去计算的，所以也应该以一并出售的价格来计算。上诉庭把高院的一审判决推翻，判是应该赔41,190英镑。这是因为被告在订约时并不知道原告从米兰银行购买的价格，他只知道原告将会去把这15栋房屋分别出售。所以，损失计算应该是以违约方在订约时的知情与愿意承担的赔偿责任为准。上诉庭是这样说：“To put it another way, to

measure Duncan‟s loss by reference to a basis of valuation which was not that on

which Underwoods were asked to advise would impose on the valuer a liability

greater than he could reasonably have thought he was undertaking.”

看来这表示在一般情况下，在国际货物买卖或其他涉及市场的交易，买方在订约前去通知卖方特殊情况例如分销或转售，不一定是明智之举。因为在毁约时，如果该货物或商品市场价格高涨（这也往往是导致卖方毁约与拒绝供货的诱因），受害方买方根据“breach day rule”，也就是根据违约时市场价格与合约价格的差价，去作出索赔。会遇上毁约方卖方抗拒说应该只能索赔分销合约与原合约价格的差价。这方面也可以去节录Thomas大法官在North Sea Energy Holdings v.

Petroleum Authority of Thailand (1997) 2 Lloyd‟s Rep. 418中的有关判词：

“If, in this case, MSH (受害方/卖方) could have claimed damages by reference to a

market, then whether or not oil could have been delivered under the Magoil offer （供应方） would, in accordance with those authorities, be irrelevant. But, in this action,

MSH base their claim to damages solely by reference to a specific offer which they

say would have entitled them to very significant profits; it must follow that the party

in repudiation, PTT（毁约方/买方）, can contend that those profits could never have

been earned because that specific offer could never have been performed. The cases

upon which MSH rely are not material to the factual issue in this case of the proof of

damages by reference to the Magoil contract.”

4

The “Heron II ”先例的解读

接下去是贵族院的重要先例The “Heron II ” (1967) 2 Lloyd‟s Rep 457。案情又涉及了航运，该船舶从罗马尼亚装了3千吨食糖到伊拉克的巴斯拉港。本来这一个航次所需要的时间只是20天，但由于船舶在中途不合理绕航（去了另一个港口加装其他货物，但没有在租约内说明），导致了10天的延误。如果船舶准时抵达，该批食糖的应得价格是97,000英镑左右。但因为延误，实得的价格只有93,000英镑，两者相差4,000英镑的市场损失。在仲裁中，被认定是船舶不合理绕航。剩下来的争议主要是在损失的计算，也就是违约方船东在订约时是否可以合理预见食糖市场的损失有可能或很有可能。这也被法院认定是船东（即使不是一个食糖的贸易商）一般性应该知道，也就是属于推定知情。其中，Morris勋爵是这样说：

“The carriage of sugar from the Black Sea to Iraqi ports (including Basrah) is a

recognized trade. The appellant knew that there was a sugar market at Basrah.

When he contracted with the respondents to carry their sugar to Basrah, though he did

not know what were the actual plans of the respondents, he had all the information to

enable him to appreciate that a delay in things result in their suffering some loss. He

must have known that the price in a market may fluctuate. He must have known that

if a price goes down someone whose goods are late in arrival may be caused loss…I

think that it must follow that, where there is delay in arrival, in many cases the actual

loss suffered (above the amount of which there ought not to be recovery) can be

measured by comparing the market price of the goods at the date when they should

have arrived and the market price when they did arrive. That prima facie is the

measure of the damages.”

在该先例贵族院对Victoria Laundry先例主要的一个批评就是在第二条损失规定的“合理预见”（reasonably foreseeable），Reid勋爵认为这带来合约与侵权的混淆。因为在侵权下，被告作为一般人是能够合理预见会发生的事十分广泛，包括一些最不寻常的损失类别，除非这种损失风险小到一种可以不去理会的情况：

“The defendant will be liable for any type of damage which is reasonably

foreseeable as liable to happen even in the most unusual case, unless the risk is so

small that a reasonable man would in the whole circumstances feel justify in

neglecting it.”。

Reid勋爵认为在Hadley v. Baxendale，可以作为正常损失向违约方索赔取回的损失不是合理预见的测试，而是去看合约并出双方订约时“可以料想得到”（in the

parties‟ contemplation）有可能发生的损失类别。他是这样说有关Hadley v.

Baxendale：

“…did not intend that every type of damage which was reasonably foreseeable by

the parties when the contract was make should either be considered as arising

naturally, i.e. in the usual course of things, or be supposed to have been in the

contemplation of the parties. Indeed the decision makes it clear that a type of damage

which was plainly foreseeable as a real possibility but which would only occur in a

small minority of cases cannot be regarded as arising in the usual course of things or

be supposed to have been in the contemplation of the parties: the parties are not

supposed to contemplate as grounds for the recovery of damage any type of loss or

damage which on the knowledge available to the defendant would appear to him as

only likely to occur in a small minority of cases.”

4.1 “合理预见”与“料想得到”的分别

可以说，在The “Heron II”，贵族院是把Victoria Laundry v. Newman Industries

(1949) 2 K.B. 528的“合理预见”（reasonably foreseeable）变了是“料想得到”（within contemplation）。这两个测试中，前者是属于侵权而后者属于合约，正如Upjohn勋爵在The “Heron II”所说：“it is better to use contemplate or contemplation

in the case of contract, leaving foresee or foreseeability to the realm of torts”。表面看来，它们有一定的区别。例如，侵权的测试会比较宽，也不会好像合约的测试会有个别案子带来的多样变化，比方是不同的行业就会带来不同的推定知情，双方也可以通过订约前的通知令对方能够对特别损失真正知情。但纯粹是从一般的违约方对某种损失能否合理预见或合理料想得到，这看来是没有什么差别。在Parsons v. Uttley Ingham (1977) 2 Lloyd‟s Rep. 522，Scarman大法官是这样说：“it

may be that the necessary reconciliation is to be found, notwithstanding the strictures

of Lord Reid, in holding that the difference between „reasonably foreseeable‟ (the test

in tort) and „reasonably contemplated‟ (the test in contract) is semantic, not substantial.

Certainly, Asquith LJ in Victoria Laundry and Lord Pearce in The „Heron II‟ thought

so, and I confess I think so too.”

4.2 Hadley v. Baxendale先例的两条规则实是一条规则的说法

普通法发展到The “Heron II”的“可以合理料想到”（within reasonable

contemplation）某种类的损失“不是不可能”（not unlikely）会因违约而产生，就可以去区分某一种损失的类别是否可以或不可以去向违约方索赔，就开始有了说法是Hadley v. Baxendale的两条规则实质上是一条规则。这可以去节录Goff大法官在The “Pegase” (1981) 1 Lloyd‟s Rep 175是这样解释：“The general result of

the two cases (Victoria Laundry v. Newman Industries 与 The Heron II) is that the

principle in Hadley v Baxendale is now no longer stated in terms of two rules, but

rather in terms of a single principle – thought it is recognized that the application of

the principle may depend on the degree of relevant knowledge held by the defendant

at the time of the contract in the particular case. This approach accords very much to

what actually happens in practice; the Courts have not been over-ready to pigeon-hole

the cases under one or other of the so-called rules in Hadley v Baxendale, but rather to

decide each case on the basis of the relevant knowledge of the defendant.”

同一个说法在好几个重要先例都有涉及，例如在Kpohraror v. Woolwich Building

Society (1996) 4 ALL ER 116，案情涉及了银行错误地不兑现客户的一张支票，法院判客户的信誉受到损害的损失可以根据Hadley v. Baxendale的第一条损失规定，也就是一般损失成功索赔。但客户生意上的损失就被视为是特别损失，这是被告银行在没有通知下料想不到的。上诉庭的Evans大法官是这样说：“The

contentions for both parties were presented as if a straitjacket imposed by the strict

application of the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale so as to require the separate

consideration of each of the two limbs … I would prefer to hold that the starting point

for any application of Hadley v. Baxendale is the extent of the shared knowledge of

both parties when the contract was made … When that is established, it may often be

the case that the first and second parts of the rule overlap, or at least that it is

unnecessary to draw a clear line of demarcation between them.”

但在《McGregor on Damages》（2003第六版）之202页的注脚50提到这一个问题是学术性的，说：“It can indeed be said to be largely an academic question whether

recovery for a contractual loss falls under the first or the second rule in Hadley v.

Baxendale …”

笔者就可以接下去跳到一个最近期的先例，这是在The “Achilleas”（2007）1

Lloyd‟s Rep. 19, Christopher Clark大法官也有说Hadley v. Baxendale的两条规则在现代的做法是把它视为一条综合性损失规定 (the modern approach is to treat

the rule as a composite whole)，而这个规定是如下：

“(a) The mere fact that a type of loss is foreseeable is not, of itself, sufficient to

make it recoverable; someone may foresee a result that is very remote. （损失类别光是可以预见有可能产生并不足够，有一些人是可以预见很长远的后果。）

(b) A claimant is, however, entitled to recover damages in respect of a foreseeable

result which either:－ （原告受害方可以索赔损失是能够预见到，并且是）

（i） will happen in the great majority of cases; or （在大部分的情况下会产生）

（ii） in respect of which, on the facts known or available to the defendant, the

chances of its happening are considerably less than evens but the occurrence of which

would not be very unusual.” （在被告违约方所知情或能够知情的事实情况下，会产生的机会是远低于50%，但如果产生的话并非不寻常）

Christopher Clark大法官看来还是用“合理预见”的测试，但去把合约的合理预见加上了限制，变了与侵权有所分别。例如在不知情的情况下，合理预见必须是在大部分情况会发生或产生的损失类别。

4.3 大部分情况下发生的程度是指什么

能够料想到在大部分情况下会发生的损失是属于Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 9 Ex.

341先例中第一类的损失，就是在The “Achilleas”（2007）1 Lloyd‟s Rep. 19先例中被提到是大部分情况下会发生（will happen in the great majority of cases）。这让笔者注意到机率（odds）这个问题。表面看来，发生机率低的损失不应该是大部

分会遇到的情况。但在一些著名的案例中并不是这样说，他们针对的并不是某一个损失的机率高低，而是去看损失的类别（type of loss）是否在某一种违约/毁约情况下是大部分会遇到。这里第一个先例就是The “Heron II” (1969) 1 AC 350，Pearce勋爵举了一个例子说明某种损失类别是属于某种违约很自然会导致的，但机率造成有关的损失不一定是高。他举的例子是针对高院的屋顶维修，但承建商没有把工程做好而构成违约。结果屋顶塌下来，把人压伤。作为损失的类别，可以说是最自然不过，因为屋顶维修有疏忽会塌下来并压伤人是小孩子都知道的。但如果去把高院不上班的时候、周末与假期等都计算进去，就会发觉屋顶在塌下来的时候下面有人被压伤的机率只有十分之一。这就变了去看机率就不是属于多数遇到的情况。Pearce勋爵是这样说：

“I do not think that Alderson B. (in Hadley v. Baxendale) was directing his mind to

whether something resulting in the natural course of events was an odds-on chance or

not. A thing may be a natural (or even an obvious) result even though the odds are

against it. Suppose a contractor was employed to repair the ceiling of one of the Law

Courts and did it so negligently that it collapsed on the heads of those in court. I

should be inclined to think that any tribunal (including the learned baron himself)

would have found as a fact that the damage arose „naturally, i.e. according to the usual

course of things.‟ Yet if one takes into account the nights, weekends, and vacations,

when the ceiling might have collapsed, the odds against it collapsing on top of

anybody‟s head are nearly ten to one. I do not believe that this aspect of the matter

was fully considered and worked out in the judgment. He was thinking of causation

and type of consequence rather than of odds.”。

另一个先例是Parson (Livestock) v. Uttley Ingham & Co (1978) QB 791，上诉庭的Scarman大法官说：

“It does not matter, in my judgment, if (the defendants) thought that the chance of

physical injury … was slight, or that the odds were against it, provided they

contemplated as a serious possibility the type of consequence, not necessarily the

specific consequences, that ensured on breach. Making the assumption as to breach

that the judge did, no more than common sense was needed for them to appreciate that

food affected by bad storage conditions might well cause illness in the pigs fed upon

it.”。

5

损失类别只要是在双方订约时料想到的范围内，而与损失的严重性无关

上述所讲的实际会产生损失的机率不在考虑范围，也可以延伸去考虑实际损失的

严重性。只要是损失类别是属于某一种违约的大部分情况下会产生，而且在订约时可以合理料想得到，这就已经足够。这方面的权威先例是Parsons v. Uttley

Ingham (1977) 2 Lloyd‟s Rep. 522，案情涉及了原告（养猪场场主）向被告（生产散装饲料储存漏斗的厂家）订造了一个漏斗以储存猪饲料。合约订明漏斗必须配有通风盖。漏斗造成后运到猪场安装时，被告忘了打开漏斗的通风盖。由于该漏斗高达28英尺，从地面根本无法看到通风盖是否开着，后来因为缺乏通风饲料逐渐霉变，而原告还懵然不知继续拿来喂猪，直到一些猪只病了才发现问题。之后发生猪瘟共死了254头猪。该案主要是判被告要否赔偿原告猪只死亡的重大损失。上诉庭判下来认为，被告只要有一般常识就应料想得到储存条件差会造成饲料变质，从而很可能引起吃这些饲料的猪只发病。因此，猪只发病死亡的损失类别是违约的被告可以在订约时合理料想得到的，他必须赔偿这一类损失。另外，Scarman大法官特别指出，只要认定被告订约时应能合理料想得到某类违约会做成某类损失，就可以判令被告负责此类损失的赔偿，而不必再追究此类损失的具体程度如何、是否出于意料之外的严重。比如该案中猪是病了还是死了、死了多少头等，这些都不必深究，反正要全赔。他是这样说：

“It does not matter, in my judgment, if the defendant thought that the chance of

physical injury ... was slight, or that the odds were against it, provided they

contemplated as a serious possibility the type of consequence, not necessarily the

specific consequence, that ensued on breach. Making the assumption as to breach that

the judge did, no more than common sense was needed for them to appreciate that

food affected by bad storage conditions might well cause illness in the pigs fed upon

it.”。

该上诉庭判例的总结是说：“The defendant were liable for the illness and death of

the pigs and that they ought reasonably to have foreseen that if the hopper,

unventilated, was unfit for the storage of pignuts to be fed to the plaintiff‟s pigs, there

was a serious possibility that the pigs might become ill… The fact that the pigs

suffered from E Coli, a far worse illness than could then be foreseen did not lessen the

liability since the type or kind of damage was foreseeable even if the extent of it was

not.”

合约是如此，侵权行为亦是如此，只要造成的实际损失是可合理预见的类别，则后果严重程度将不加以理会，正如“egg-shell skull”与“shabby millionaire”都有这种精神在内。

6

实质损失和经济损失的分别

法律针对“实质的损失和伤亡”（physical injury and damage）与“经济损失”（economic loss）例如利润损失，看来是有所分别，虽然这两类损失都是在订约时可以料想得到如果违约有可能会产生的损失。在先例Parsons v. Uttley Ingham

(1977) 2 Lloyd‟s Rep. 522中，Denning勋爵明确地把它们作出了区分，认为针对前者，违约方在订约时只要料想得到有一个轻微的可能性就已经足够要去负责，而且后果严重与否不加以考虑。但针对后者，就需要在订约时有一个重大的可能性才需要负责。他是这样说：

“In the … loss of profit cases – the defaulting party is only liable for the

consequences if they are such as, at the time of the contract he ought reasonably to

have contemplated as a serious possibility or real danger … In the … physical injury

or expense case – the defaulting party is liable for any damage which he ought

reasonably to have foreseen at the time of the breach as a possible consequence, even

if it was only a slight possibility …”

Scarman大法官也同意Denning勋爵的意见，并提出经济损失只涉及违约/毁约，而合约则有充分的订约自由，说：

“I agree with Lord Denning, M.R., in thinking it absurd that the test for remoteness

of damage should, in principle, differ according to the legal classification of the cause

of action – though one must recognise that parties to a contract have the right to agree

on a measure of damages which may be greater or less, than the law would offer in

the absence of agreement …”

针对实质的损失和伤亡，可去节录《McGregor on Damages》（第十七版）一书之6-157段所说有关不理会实际损失的严重程度，如下：

“It is submitted that, in contract as in tort, it should suffice that, if physical injury or

damage is within the contemplation of the parties, recovery is not to be limited

because the degree of physical injury or damage could not have been anticipated.”

但涉及经济损失（例如受害方的利润损失），即使损失类别是在订约双方料想得到的范围内，也有不同的对待。例如在Victoria Laundry v. Newman (1949) 2 KB

528，一般性的利润损失就可以去成功索赔，但利润很高的就被视为是特别损失。显然，实际损失的程度严重与否是有区分的。所以在Brown v. K.M.R. Services

(1995) 2 Lloyd‟s Rep. 513，上诉庭的Stuart Smith大法官是这样说：“I do not see

any difficulty in holding that loss of ordinary business profits are different in kind

from those flowing from a particular contract which gives rise to very high profits, the

existence of which is unknown to the other party and who therefore does not accept

the risk of such loss occurring.”

在另一个先例North Sea Energy Holdings v. Petroleum Authority of Thailand (1997)

2 Lloyd‟s Rep. 418，案情涉及石油的买卖，卖家有很大的利润损失，但是无法向违约的买家成功索赔。一个原因是因为买家在订约时根本不可能知道这票石油是卖家以低于合约价格非常多的价格从另外的供应商买得，而这一买一卖的价格差本会为卖家带来极大的利润。

至于实质损失与经济损失为什么有这样的差异，前者比较宽松的一个原因会是实质损失通常被视为是毁约所造成的直接后果（direct consequence）。另一个原因是Denning勋爵在Parsons v. Uttley Ingham所说的在该先例的同类情况下，受害方会有可能直接去向供应商根据产品责任去提出索赔，这就涉及了侵权行为。所以，针对合理预见，合约与侵权针对这种实质损失就应该是一致，比较宽松。这在实际伤亡也是一样，受害方可以直接根据侵权向责任方去提出索赔。

至于经济损失（例如是利润损失）比较严格对待，正如Brown v. K.M.R. Services先例所说，正常的业务所带来的利润是与一些特殊合约带来的极高利润被视为两类不同的损失类别。同样的说法也在近期的Mayhaven Healthcare Ltd v. Bothma

(2009) EWHC 2634 (TCC)先例出现。这等于是实际损失的程度严重与否是会带来区分。毕竟，违约方如果担心要负责极高利润的损失，由于有订约自由，他可以在订约时以合约条文（如免责条文或责任限制条文）去减少损失。

7

The “Achilleas”先例对损失规定带来的不明朗

在这个贵族院的重要海事先例The “Achilleas” (2009) 1 AC 61 (HL)，涉及了损失的遥远性问题，并且带来了一些不明朗，即是否对Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 9 Ex.

341有所改变。去详细讨论之前，不妨先介绍有关的案情。

7.1 案情介绍

这可去节录杨大明律师所著的《期租合约》之125页，如下：

“首先笔者去介绍该案例的有关事实。它是一个5-7个月的期租，并后来去再续期5-7个月，租金是每天16,750美元。反正，可计算出来的还船最后日子（terminal

redelivery date）是2004年5月2日。在这一天之前之4月20日，承租人给了还船通知说是在4月30日至5月2日之间。这一来，船东就去在市场订下下一个4-6个月的期租，租金是每天39,500美元，而销约期是5月8日。可以说如果承

租人能准时在5月2日还船，赶得及下一个租约的销约期可以说是绰绰有余。但最终船舶是在5月11日才在日本的大分港（Oita）卸清了煤炭并去还船给船东。这一来超出或延迟的时间是9天，与市场租金的差价去比较损失应是158,301.17美元。但实际上船东的损失远不止此数，这是因为延迟至5月11日还船就错过了下一个租约的5月8日销约期，而当时市场租金急剧下挫，这导致了船东最终被下一个租约承租人压价才保住了这份租约。这压的价是从原先订下的39,500美元变为31,500美元，等于每天损失8,000美元。这去乘以至少4个月的租约期，船东真正的损失就变成了1,364,584.37美元。

在伦敦仲裁，多数的两位仲裁员认为承租人应该赔偿船东真正的损失。但另一位不同意见的著名仲裁员认为针对这个问题的先例一直很稳定，只去赔偿船东租约租金与市场租金的差价，不应去轻易改动，令人无所适从。他也在后来私下通知说他不相信该船东在下一个租约被压价是真实的， 所以主要因为这个原因而持不同意见。这一个仲裁被败诉的承租人（香港的Transfield Shipping Inc）上诉去法院，但被驳回，Clarke大法官认为承租人在订约时应该可以合理预见这一个类别的损失并非是不太可能（not unlikely）会产生，即使这种情况会发生的机率是低于50%，这也是去支持多数仲裁员所裁决的说法，就是这种损失可以在今天航运市场在订约时可以预见到。

这一来， 何谓遥远的损失 (remoteness) 被扩大不少， 特别是针对大家是在同一行业的合同双方， 都被视为在订约时应该能够预见在该行业的一般做法与市场变化。 仍会被视为是不可预见的遥远损失看来只会局限在只有索赔方自己才能知道的一些特殊、 不平常与奇怪的方面所带来的损失， 这种损失只能在订约时通知了对方才能去成功索赔，但它不会是太多。反正是，在著名的Hadley v.

Baxendale先例中所作出的两个分支，即一般损失与特别损失，后者是要在订约前通知对方才能成功索赔， 两者看来已经是没有什么区分了。”

杨大明律师的《期租合约》一书因出版时间较早，没有去针对贵族院最后对The

“Achilleas”的判例。但可以说，多数仲裁员的裁决以及高院与上诉庭都认为船东这一种损失的类别是属于Hadley v. Baxendale中第一类别的一般损失（ordinary

damages），所以是可以向违约（延误还船）的承租人索赔。至于实际损失是严重或是不严重，已经在先例Parsons v. Uttley Ingham (1977) 2 Lloyd‟s Rep. 522介绍过这是不受影响的。但笔者是倾向同一这个少数仲裁员的不同意见，因为知道这样判法的危险性。原因是在期租合约，会导致延误还船的情况比比皆是。例如在卸港遇上坏天气就会拖延卸货时间几天，卸港拥挤又会延误靠泊几天，领港或拖轮罢工又会延误进港或开航几天，这种例子多不胜数，导致承租人在一个航次期租（time charter trip）或者一个期租最后的航次中根本没有办法掌握准确的还船时间。在航运市场上涨的时候，本来只去支付延误还船那几天的差价是一直以来

承租人可以接受的。但如果现在要面对船东可能因为延误还船而错过了下一个租约的消约期所带来的所有损失就很难接受了。而且笔者也担心一些精明的船东很容易作假，就是把船舶的下一航次租给自己联营公司（但表面看不出来，因为是一家巴拿马或利比里亚公司，要查他的底细也无从去查）。而租约是10年，租金订得很高，而消约期是只要原来的租约延误还船1、2天就会错过。这岂非是让船东在延误还船1、2天就可以向承租人索赔（或）一两千万美元不等金额的庞大损失？话总是有的说，精明的承租人可以通过订约自由在他的期租合约内去规定如果发生延误还船只要赔偿的只是超出时间的租金差价。但总会有承租人会上当，而法律默示地位能够做到还是最好是公平合理与实践。

7.2 贵族院的“客观去看订约双方是否愿意承担赔偿的责任”的测试

幸亏The “Achilleas”在贵族院被改变过来，判承租人所需要赔偿的金额只是延迟的9天，与市场租金的差价去比较，也就是158,301.17美元。但贵族院主要的判决原因是由Hoffmann勋爵作出，大致上是说，赔偿是要根据合约中双方所自愿去承担的损失。而在该先例，客观去看承租人在有关的租约下应该只愿意去承担9天的差价，而不是下一个租约所有的损失。Hoffmann勋爵是这样说：

“The findings of the majority arbitrators shows that they considered their decision to

be contrary to what would have been the expectations of the parties, but dictated by

the rules in Hadley v Baxendale as explained in The Heron II (1969) 1 AC 350. But in

my opinion these rules are not so inflexible; they are intended to give effect to the

presumed intentions of the parties and not to contradict them.

The owners submit that the question of whether the damage is too remote is a

question of fact on which the arbitrators have found in their favour. It is true that the

question of whether the damage was foreseeable is a question of fact: see Monarch

Steamship Co Ltd v. Karlshamns Oljefabriker (A/B) (1949) AC 196. But the question

of whether a given type of loss is one for which a party assumed contractual

responsibility involves the interpretation, is a question of law.（船东说损失是否太遥远是一项事实的认定，而多数仲裁员已经判船东胜诉，这表示法院不应该再去干预事实的认定。但Hoffmann勋爵说虽然损失的在订约时可否预见或料想得到是事实问题，但某一类的损失是否是违约方愿意承担合约责任就涉及了解释合约，这是法律问题。）

…In my opinion, the findings of the arbitrators and the commercial background to the

agreement are sufficient to make it clear that the charterer cannot reasonably be

regarded as having assumed the risk of the owner‟s loss of profit on the following

charter. I would therefore allow the appeal.（在Hoffmann勋爵看来，仲裁庭的事实认定加上商业背景显示了被告承租人不能被合理认为是愿意在租约中承担下一个租约中船东所损失的的所有利润。）”

贵族院多数的上述意见是支持“客观去看订约双方是否愿意承担赔偿的责任”（objective assessment in the voluntary assumption of responsibility）的测试，带来了不稳定与是否去改变了Hadley v. Baxendale与Victoria Laundry这两个一脉相承的重要先例带来的大原则，就是只去区分一般损失与特别损失或是去出违约方在订约时是否可以合理料想得到有可能会产生损失的类别。这一个新的说法带来了要去进一步考虑双方在合约中所愿意承担赔偿的责任就会带来额外争议，因为在每一个不同的合约针对双方愿意承担什么赔偿责任都会涉及谈判过程和合约的解释，这包括了更多事实的认定（finding of facts）和法律的确定（holding of

law），这会在针对损失遥远的诉讼变了是更昂贵与不稳定。

7.3 The “Achilleas”带来的新测试之后的先例

所以就带来后来的一些先例去质疑Hoffmann勋爵的说法到底有没有改变Hadley

v. Baxendale的损失规定，在以下段节会介绍。

7.3.1

第一个先例是The “Amer Energy” (2009) 1 Lloyd‟s Rep 293，它就是著名的有关首席仲裁员Duncan Matthews QC被法院在开庭时赶走的先例ASM Shipping。但目前介绍的是该先例的续集，也就是针对实体的争议。案情是有关一个航次租约去科威特装一船汽油（gas oil）去地中海或红海港口。但由于船舶延误，导致了承租人的联营公司（都属于Sempra石油集团的公司）失去了买卖合约，因为买方因延误而取消。所以，承租人向船东索赔的是利润损失，共达750,000美元。结果是仲裁庭的Bruce Harris、Tony Scott与Steven Berry QC（他替代了Duncan

Matthews QC作为首席）判船东败诉，要赔付这笔钱。船东向英国法院申请批文，根据的就是1996年《英国仲裁法》之Section 69。而有关的法律观点就是说，在Achilleas”（2007）1 Lloyd‟s Rep. 19后，针对损失遥远性的新测试（new test）就是这一种类的损失是否船东在订约时愿意去承担责任（The damage of a type and

kind for which the owners ought fairly to be taken to have assumed responsibility），而船东认为裁决书是没有这方面的认定或确定，不能去做出这样的结论。

胜诉承租人的一方代表大律师抗拒说，承租人在这一方面的利润损失是船东在订约时可以料想得到，不是不可能（not unlikely）会产生的损失类别。再说，即使是属于特别损失，承租人在谈判的时候也作出了通知，如下：

有关先例之一：The “Amer Energy”

“the owners‟ agent Mr Moustakas had been told during the fixture negotiations that

the proposed cargo of oil was being traded and that the charterers were part of a larger

group. It would have been clear to him that, in the event the owners were in breach,

charterers‟ affiliates and associates‟ would suffer losses. If contrary to the arbitrators'

finding the matters which gave rise to the losses were not in the ordinary course of

things but were special circumstances, the owners through Mr Moustakas had

sufficient knowledge of those special circumstances. In other words, to the extent

necessary, the charterers could satisfy the second limb of Hadley v. Baxendale.”

最终是Flaux大法官拒绝作出上述的批文，并说明他不认为在The “Achilleas”，贵族院有任何意图去作出任何新的测试去改变有关Hadley v. Baxendale的损失规定，说：

“To the extent that Lord Hoffmann was purporting to lay down some new test to

recoverability of damages in contract, he was a minority. Although Lord Hope adopts

a similar analysis at paras 30 and 36, he does so essentially by edges in paras 9 and 11

of his option that departure from the normal principles of foreseeability would be

unusual. Although he refers to shipping as a market where limitations on the extent of

liability arising out of general expectation in that market might be more common, I do

not consider that he was intending to say that in all shipping cases (as opposed to the

type of time charter case then under consideration) the rule in Hadley v Baxendale as

subsequently refined, will no longer apply. If he was saying that, it was not a view

shared by the majority and it would be heterodox to say the least.”

7.3.2

Berhad

这是另一个有关的航运先例，案情涉及了在2008年8月中订立的2个航次的包运合同（COA）准备去运矿砂。众所周知，到了2008年10月左右，发生了全球的金融海啸，航运市场也受到很严重的冲击，在接下来的不久下挫了高达95%以上。这导致了承租人很大的压力，甚至也没有能力去在卸港贮存与生产这些即将付运的矿砂。而承租人也在2008年11月取得了卖方的同意去押后付运矿砂，导致了再也不需要船东去履行这一个包运合约。这无可避免地导致了承租人以合约受阻（frustration of contract）与不可以抗力为由拒绝履行合约，而船东也接受了毁约，并在英国法院申请了一个即时裁决（summary judgment）。而承租人就要求英国法院中止（stay）审理，因为在包运合约中有一条仲裁条文。在船东的立场，一个包运合约在没有法律上的障碍（legal prohibition）或是实质性的无法有关先例之二：Classic Maritime Inc v. Lion Diversified Holding

履行（例如唯一的装港/卸港发生灾难性的破坏），是很难因为市场改变去导致受阻。其中一个重要的原因是包运合约不像一个航次租约，是为了将来的远期合约（forward contract）。这表示双方在很大程度就应该在这种合约里明示或默示去分摊了将来有可能发生的变数所带来的后果或责任承担（例如是通过免责条文）。这方面的先例有贵族院的Larrinaga & Co. v. Societe Franco Americaine des

Phosphates (1923) 14 Lloyd‟s Rep 457，说：

“In effect, most forward contracts can be regarded as a form of commercial

insurance in which every event is intended to be at the risk of one party or another.

Each party is likely most to need the maintenance of such a contract exactly when the

other would most wish to be rid of it. … All the uncertainties of a commercial

contract can ultimately be expressed, though not very accurately, in terms of money,

and rarely, if ever, is it a ground for inferring frustration of an adventure, that the

contract has turned out to be a loss or even a commercial disaster for somebody. If a

contract is really a speculative contract, as this plainly is, the doctrine of frustration

can rarely, if ever, apply to it, for the basis of a speculative contract is to distribute all

the risks on one side or on the other and to eliminate any chance of the contract falling

to the ground, unless, indeed, the law has put an end to it. … No one can tell how long

a spell of commercial depression may last; no suspense can be more harassing than

the vagaries of foreign exchanges: but contracts are made for the purpose of fixing the

incidence of such risks in advance, and their occurrence only makes it the more

necessary to uphold a contract and not to make them the ground for discharging it.”

笔者回到本章要针对的损失遥远性，针对这方面，船东索赔两个航次的金额高达18,000,000美元，而损失的计算是根据“breach day rule”，也就是包运合约的运费去与波罗的好望角型船舶指数（Baltic Capesize Index）的市场价格比较的差价作为基础。承租人认为索赔的金额过高，第一就是波罗的好望角型船舶指数不准确代表在某一天（也就是毁约的一天）的市场运费，这一方面承租人会将来在仲裁中提供专家意见作为证据。第二个承租人提出的抗辩是在The“Achilleas”先例，贵族院提出了一个新测试，就是这一种类的损失是否船东在订约时愿意去承担责任（The damage of a type and kind for which the owners ought fairly to be taken

to have assumed responsibility）。由于在2008年底的历史性动荡，承租人是不应该在订约时愿意去承担全部的损失的，因为这是双方根本料想不到的。能够料想到的只能是一般运费市场的波动。这方面的争辩可去节录如下：

“An argument was raised with regard to The Achilleas [2008] 2 Lloyd‟s Rep. 275.

Lion submitted that the House of Lords had set out a new test for the recoverability of

damages for breach of contract, namely whether the loss was a type of loss for which

the party in breach could reasonably be regarded as having assumed responsibility.

Because of the extreme volatility of the freight market in late 2008 it was submitted

that Limbungan could not be liable for the full extent of the loss claimed by Classic

which reflected the full 95% fall in freight rates, but only for the loss flowing from a

fall in freight rates for vessels of the kind in question, of the magnitude which the

parties would have contemplated, at the time of contracting, as being likely to occur in

the ordinary course of things.”

英国高院的Cooke大法官也是不认为The “Achilleas”针对损失的遥远性规定有作出任何改变，说：“I would be highly surprised, if this was the effect of their

Lordships‟ decision. I note that Flaux J was wholly unpersuaded that the House of

Lords had changed the law on remoteness - see The‘Amer Energy’(2009) 1 Lloyd‟s

Rep. 293.”Cooke 大法官认为市场的波动是双方在订合约的时候可以料想得到的损失类别，并且在分析了几个大法官在The “Achilleas”的判决后，认为只要损失的类别是料想到，严重的程度是不在考虑之内的，说：“In my judgment,

notwithstanding references to the unforeseen degree of fluctuation in the market, not

one of their Lordships was saying that, if the type of loss was within the

contemplation of the parties or that for which the party in breach must be assumed to

have accepted responsibility, some of it might be irrecoverable because the extent of it

was unexpected.”

7.3.3

有关先例之三：GB Gas Holding Ltd v. Accenture

这一个GB Gas Holding Ltd v. Accenture (UK) Ltd (2009) EWHC 2734 (Comm)先例中涉及The“Achilleas”(2008) 2 Lloyd‟s Rep. 275先例中所谓的新测试并不多，这不像其他几个在这里介绍的先例，但基本上还是依据了Hadley v. Baxendale的两种损失规定去分析好几项不同的损失类别。

案情涉及了英国天然气公司作为原告，这一公司向英国接近两千万顾客提供天然气与电力，这涉及了大量的账目结算问题。所以在2002年初与被告Accenture达成协议，由后者去设计、提供、安装与保养一套新的信息技术（IT）去处理这些账单的问题。但到了2006年中，这方面出了大量的问题，这最终导致了原告指控被告违约并索赔损失。这些损失包括了：原告需要去雇用数以千计的额外雇员去处理这些问题，包括对不满顾客的投诉去做出解释；原告需要把数以百万英镑的没有开出账单或者延误收费的坏账去销账；原告需要去做出大量的调查与针对大量问题做出解决；等。

在有关的合约中，有一条明示条文去豁免损失，豁免的损失包括了“直接或者间

接的利润损失”、“直接或者间接的业务/收入损失”与“间接或惩罚性损失与费用”如下：

“16.2 Consequential Loss

Subject to Clause 16.7 or as otherwise expressly provided in this Agreement, in no

event shall either Party be liable whether in contract, tort (including negligence) or

otherwise in respect of any of the following losses or damages:

16.2.1 loss of profits or of contracts arising directly or indirectly;

16.2.2 loss of business or of revenues arising directly or indirectly;

16.2.3 any losses, damages, costs or expenses whatsoever to the extent that

these are indirect or consequential or punitive;

save that this Clause 16.2 shall not apply in the event that either party terminates this

Agreement other than in accordance with Clause 21.”

双方同意在16条文的“直接”（directly）与“间接”（indirectly）就是指Hadley v.

Baxendale的第一条损失规定与第二条损失规定。

针对各项不同类别的损失，第一项的Gas Distribution Charges（高达1,870万英镑），被告的抗辩是这属于收入损失或者利润损失，根据合约的第16条文是不必去赔付的。原告的解释是他要去向经销商批发买进天然气然后再供应给顾客，其间他需要把顾客消耗的天然气表所记录的数字转告给经销商，让经销商去向原告收费。但由于被告对顾客账目的问题，导致了无法提供15%顾客消耗的天然气数字给经销商，从而导致经销商作出偏高的估计向原告收费。针对这一项损失，Field大法官判这不是一项收入或利润损失，而是Hadley v. Baxendale的第一条规定，是违约方在这一个合约的本质下，在订约时就可以合理料想到会发生的一般损失。

第二项的名誉损失与赔偿给顾客的800万英镑，原告指这一问题导致了大量顾客的不满，在2006到2007的一年间，流失了77万以上的顾客。为了对这一名誉的损害作出补救，原告对一些顾客作出了赔偿，也就是这笔800万英镑。被告声称这笔支付并非是法律的责任需要支付，而是属于馈赠（ex gratia payment），并提到了The“Achilleas”先例。而英国法院的Field大法官只是简单针对被告的抗辩并判这笔损失也是在Hadley ale的第一条损失规定内，说：

“Accenture contends that the sum paid out was paid ex gratia and is plainly an

indirect or consequential loss. Mr Vos（被告的代表大律师）cited paragraphs 21 – 25

of Lord Hoffmann‟s judgement in The Achilleas [2009] 1 AC 61.

In my judgement this item of loss is neither indirect nor consequential but falls within

the first limb of Hadley v Baxendale. Having regard to the Amended JPA （有关合约）overall and to the relevant background, including Recital (A) I think it plain that

one of the purposes of the new billing system was to improve customer relations and

customer services. It is equally plain that in the context of the Amended JPA,

Accenture assumed responsibility for losses in terms of compensation paid to

customers if the billing system failed to perform as it was intended it should

perform.”

其他项目的损失类别包括了额外贷款费用的200万英镑、额外去追偿顾客收费的约39万英镑与额外的通信与文书费用约10万英镑，Field大法官都判是可以去向违约的被告提出索赔。这些费用不属于间接损失，而是属于Hadley v. Baxendale的第一条损失规则，或也没有被合约第16条文去排除。但笔者不去一一介绍了。

7.3.4

在Mayhaven Healthcare Ltd v. Bothma (2009) EWHC 2634 (TCC)也显示了Hadley

v. Baxendale的两种损失规定不是这么容易去推翻。可去简单介绍案情是有关疗养院（nursing home）的建筑工程延误所带来的预期损失/利润损失的计算。原告想将原来的收容年老残疾人士的计划改变为收容年青（18-65岁）残疾人士，因为这样可以大大增加利润。但仲裁庭判损失应该根据年老残疾人士的收入为准，认为原告计划收容年青残疾人士是属于特别损失，有必要在订合约之前通知被告。裁决书是这样写的：

“In this case, Mayhaven are developing a business plan, moving into the provision

of care for YPD（这是指“年青残疾人士”young physical disable）; in my opinion,

this is not a special contract referred to in Victoria Laundry, nor are the circumstances

similar to those in the Czarnikov case （这是指The “Heron II”先例） which related

to a cargo of sugar. The circumstances relating to this case are a change in the

provision of care to produce a significant increase in profit, to which Mayhaven （原告） were privy, and I find it is most unlikely that DAB （被告） could have

discovered this possible change in Mayhaven‟s business plan.”

原告不服上诉，认为其只需要证明疗养院是为了盈利的机构，所以利润损失是被告违约方应该知道在工程延误的情况下有可能会产生。而这只是Hadley v

Baxendale损失规定的第一条，被告根本不需要有真正知情。但在高院，Ramsey大法官支持仲裁庭，认为年青残疾人士的收容会带来高利润并非是一般损失，而是属于特别损失。Ramsey大法官也提到了利润损失不应该被视为只是一类的损失，一些特殊的、特别高的利润损失应该被视为属于第二条的损失规定，受害方有关先例之四：Mayhaven Healthcare Ltd v. Bothma

若没有作出事前通知是不能索赔的。他是这样说：

“In relation to question 2 (b), „loss of profits‟ is not to be equated to „loss of a kind‟

so as to make all profits recoverable. As Lord Hoffmann said in Transfield case （这是指The “Achilleas”先例） at para 22, the loss of profits in the Victoria Laundry case

are not a single type of case. Some may fall within the first limb （第一条损失规定）

and some within the second limb （第二条损失规定）. In this case the Arbitrator

found that loss of profit for the use of the care home for the more lucrative YPD

occupants was not recoverable for lack of actual knowledge under the second limb. I

do not consider that there was any error on a question of law in that conclusion.”

7.3.5

Ltd

在另一个上诉庭的先例Supershield Ltd v. Siemens Building Technologies FE Ltd

(2010) EWCA Civ 7，案情是有关一栋大厦的消防灭火系统，由于一个螺丝钉与螺丝帽松脱，导致水箱的水满溢出来。本来该系统还有另外一个双重防御，就是有排水道将水引至污水渠。但在事发当时，不知什么原因导致排水道堵塞。当双重防御都失灵的情况下，地库的一整层楼都被水浸了。这导致了住客庞大的损失，并向各有关方提出索赔。在诉讼过程中，Siemens作为消防灭火系统的分承建商，作出了和解。而后Siemens向他的分分承建商Supershield要求补偿，而Supershield提出的其中一个争议是Siemens的水浸损失是太遥远，因为系统的双重防御同时失灵的机率非常低，可以说是“不可能”（unlikely）会发生。但在上诉庭，Toulson大法官不接受，认为在复杂的机器或工程（不论是一架飞机、一辆车子、一条隧道或一栋大厦），通常是期待设计与安装的承建商会加入多重的防御措施，并希望这些措施不会同时失效，导致出事故的机率是微乎其微。如果法律会导致越小心与越多防御措施就会令受害方在不幸遇上所有措施同时时效时，他的损失就会被视为是太遥远而无法索赔，显然，这并不合理。这个期待承建商会加入多重的防御措施是依赖承建商做好他的工作，如果他没有这样去做导致“不可能”的事故发生，承建商不需负责是没有理由的。而在该先例，Siemens有一个合约责任去做好他的工作防止水浸，即他作为订约方是愿意去承担水浸损失的赔偿责任。这正是Hoffmann勋爵在The “Achilleas”先例的新测试。

看来，Toulson大法官是比较愿意接受对Hadley v. Baxendale的损失规定作出重新的解读，并认为损失的遥远性应该去考虑订约方在合约中默示或明示愿意承担赔偿的责任。他是这样说：

“The law on remoteness of damage in relation to claims for breach of contract is

有关先例之五：Supershield Ltd v. Siemens Building Technologies FE

grounded on the policy that the loss recovered by the victim should be limited to loss

from which the party in breach may reasonably be taken to have assumed a

responsibility to protect the victim. It follows that the question of remoteness cannot

be isolated from consideration of the purpose of the contract and the scope of the

contractual obligation. The underlying policy is implicit in Lord Reid‟s speech in

Czarnikow v. Koufos（这是指The “Heron II”先例）, where he referred to what the

parties may be supposed to have contemplated as grounds for the recovery of

damages and linked this to the question whether the loss was sufficiently likely to

result from the breach to make it proper to hold that loss of that kind should have been

in the contract breaker‟s contemplation. It has been made more explicit in the

decisions of the House of Lords in South Australia Asset Management Corp v York

Montague Ltd (1997) AC 191,212 and Transfield Shipping （这是指The “Achilleas”先例）.”

Toulson大法官在考虑与解释South Australia和The “Achilleas”这两个先例后，接下去说：

“Hadley v. Baxendale remains a standard rule but it has been rationalised on the

basis that it reflects the expectation to be imputed to the parties in the ordinary case,

i.e. that a contract breaker should ordinarily be liable to the other party for damage

resulting from his breach if, but only if, at the time of making the contract as

reasonable person in his shoes would have had damage of that kind in mind as not

unlikely to result from a breach. However, South Australia and Transfield Shipping

(这就是The “Achilleas”先例) are authority that there may be cases where the court,

on examining the contract and the commercial background, decides that the standard

approach would not reflect the expectation or intention reasonably to be imputed to

the parties. In those two instances the effect was exclusionary; the contract breaker

was held not to be liable for loss which result from its breach although some loss of

the kind was not unlikely. But logically the same principle may have an inclusionary

effect. If, on the proper analysis of the contract against its commercial background,

the loss was within the scope of the duty, it cannot be regarded as too remote, even if

it would not have occurred in ordinary circumstances.”

事实上在The “Achilleas”先例，贵族院大可以不必将Hadley v. Baxendale与Victoria Laundry这两个一脉相承的损失规定作出任何改变。在The “Achilleas”，延误9天的损失是158,301.17美元，这是违约方在订约时可以合理料想得到的，可以去判是属于一般损失。但若以延误还船导致下一个租约中的所有损失去计算并得出1,364,584.37美元，这是违约方在订约时没有料想到的，可以视为是属于

特别损失。

8

最后去介绍一个较早时提到过的先例North Sea Energy Holdings v. Petroleum

Authority of Thailand (1997) 2 Lloyd‟s Rep. 418，该案涉及了一个长达5年的供应沙特阿拉伯原油合约。第一年供应1千万桶，然后逐年递增，反正5年内供应共7千万桶。买方PTT是泰国的国营单位，主要买卖原油及石油产品。卖方MSH是一家为了与PTT做这笔生意而在Netherlands Antilles成立的公司（估计不会有太大的资产）。MSH与另一家名为Magoil的摩洛哥公司稍后订立了一个同样的供应原油合约，且Magoil是与沙特阿拉伯皇室成员有关系。沙特阿拉伯原油的供应主要是控制在一家名为Aramco的公司，这是由4家最主要的美国石油公司共同组成的。Aramco后来因沙特阿拉伯政府的参与而改名为Saudi Aramco。成立该公司的主要原因说是沙特阿拉伯政府想去针对原油出口的政策执行一连串的计划与控制，包括原油只卖给大的石油公司与最后的用家（这是指一些自己有炼油厂的用家）。反正，Saudi Aramco不会向中间人和石油贸易商出售原油。在卖给最后用家的原油，Saudi Aramco也会规定价格，同样的原油会因目的地与国家的不同而以不同的价格出售。所以卖给这些用家通常有目的地的明示限制，即不允许他们转卖。在订约后，PTT一直通过MSH要求沙特阿拉伯放宽目的地的限制，为了他的炼油厂在无法处理所有原油供应后将剩余的原油转售到其他东南亚的目的地。由于PTT曾经说话过了火，被MSH掌握机会接受毁约而终断合约。反正在责任方面，被英国法院的Thomas大法官判是PTT毁约。接下去就是处理MSH提出的66,500,000美元的索赔，索赔的计算是根据Magoil合约中供应原油的价格与PTT合约价格的差价。在该案中没有去针对市场价格，因为无法去算出原油市场价格在5年内的走势以及应该供应原油的时间点的市场价格。

PTT作为被告提出的抗辩是Magoil不能够在这5年内去提供原油（例如是沙特阿拉伯不会承诺长过1年的石油供应），所以MSH实际上没有损失。但MSH的答辩是在毁约并被受害方接受后，就应根据这一个时间点去计算损失，不应去理会毁约后受害方能否去履行合约的每一步。这里有不少先例，MSH的答辩节录如下：

“MSH said that they did not have to show that oil could have been supplied under

the Magoil offer because PTT repudiated the agreement before the time for

performance of MSH‟s obligation to deliver oil had arisen.

It is not in issue that when a repudiatory breach has occurred, the innocent party is

relieved from further performance of his obligations under the contract; the innocent

party does not have to prove that he was ready, willing and able at the date of the

North Sea Energy Holdings先例的介绍

repudiation to perform the contract in accordance with its terms. This is made clear

in a number of cases, in particular D.H. Bain v. Field & Co. Fruit Merchants Ltd.,

(1920) 5 . 16 at P.17, British and Benningtons LTd. v. North Western Cachar

Tea Co. Ltd., (1922) 13 . 67; (1923) A.C. 48 at pp. 63, 66, and 72,

Continental Contractors Ltd. v. Medway Oil and Storage Co., (1925) 23 .

124 at pp.132-133 and Bulk Oil (Zug) A.G. v. Sun International Ltd., (1984) 1 Lloyd‟s

Rep. 531 at p.545. The innocent party is not required to prove, before being entitled

to damages, either that he could perform at the time of termination, or that he could

have performed in the future. Similarly, the party in repudiation cannot rely on

arguments to the effect that the innocent party could not, or might not, have been able

to perform the obligations which he had undertaken under the contract.”

但Thomas大法官只同意如果MSH是根据毁约时市场损失去提出索赔，以上的说法与先例便适用。但如果MSH是根据他与Magoil的合约去计算损失（也就是实际损失），就有必要去证明如果没有PTT的毁约，Magoil是能够在这5年内履行合约。Thomas大法官并提到其他有关的先例，例如是British & Benningtons Ltd

v. North Western Cachar Tea Co Ltd (1922) 13 Lloyd‟s Rep 67；The “Mihalis

Angelos” (1970) 2 Lloyd‟s Rep 43；Berger & Co Inc v. Gill & Duffus SA (1984) 1

Lloyd‟s Rep 27。他是这样说：

“I therefore reject MSH‟s contention that the ability to obtain the oil under the

arrangements with Magoil upon which they rely for their claim is immaterial as a

matter of law: If under the Magoil offer no oil could ever have been delivered, MSH

have lost nothing and are not entitled to U.S.$66.5 m. which they claim by reference

solely to the Magoil offer.”

在开庭取证中，包括了在电话中答应Magoil供应原油的一位沙特阿拉伯王子，也通过视象会议接受盘问，Thomas大法官最终根据平衡性的可能，认为是MSH没有办法供应这5年的大量原油，说：

“On this evidence, I find, on the balance of probabilities, that the Saudi Prince would

not have been able to make available this very large quantity of oil over a five year

period. I make the finding because it is clear that it is only in very special

circumstances that oil may be made available for the benefit of certain very senior

members of the Saudi Arabian Royal Family, that there were no special circumstances

that would explain the provision of oil to the Saudi Prince for sale to Magoil, that the

general policy of Saudi Arabia is to make one year contracts and that it is therefore

highly unlikely that oil sufficient to deliver under the agreement between MSH and

PTT could in fact have been made available. This aspect of the action is dependent

upon proof of a very special and highly profitable source of supply of oil. The fact

that a decision was taken not to make available either Magoil‟s files or any direct

evidence from the Saudi Prince or from Saudi Arabia may be explicable; it has had,

together with the other factors to which I have referred, the consequence that I have

concluded on the evidence on a balance of probabilities that oil could not have been

made available to MSH through Magoil for delivery to PTT.”

此外，由于MSH没在订约前把他与Magoil的供应原油合约通知PTT（与Magoil的合约是在和PTT订约后才签订的），根据Magoil 的合约价格去索赔也属于是特别损失而不是一般损失，更别说MSH根本无法证明。Thomas大法官说：

“I therefore conclude that the offer made by Magoil is properly characterized as an

extravagant and unusual bargain and even if oil could have been supplied through

Magoil, damages could not be claimed by reference to the arrangements with

Magoil.”

9 The “Golden Victory”先例的介绍

笔者顺便一提是有关毁约后的损失计算应否一并考虑毁约后的履行，然后得出真正的损失。在最近也有一个重要的贵族院先例，就是The “Golden Victory” (2007)

2 Lloyd‟s Rep 164。案情涉及了一个长达7年的期租合约，但由于航运市场低迷，承租人在还有大约4年才能够还船的时候就拒绝履行。这显然是一种毁约的行为，并且被船东接受。剩下来的争议就是如何计算船东的损失。这里有一个变数，就是在毁约后14个月发生了海湾战争，而根据已经终断的租约其中一条条文，允许承租人在这种情况下可以终断租约。这一来，承租人作为毁约方说是损失应该只计算14个月而不是4年，因为没有毁约的情况下，履约也只是到海湾战争为止。在该先例，损失是根据毁约时的市场租金，也就是所谓的“breach day rule”。这表示上述先例North Sea Energy Holdings v. Petroleum Authority of Thailand

(1997) 2 Lloyd‟s Rep. 418中，Thomas大法官所同意的法律地位，就是如果毁约后损失计算是根据市场价格，就不必去理会毁约后的履行。这表示The “Golden

Victory”与North Sea Energy Holdings是完全不同的先例，表面看来，毁约后14个月的海湾战争是不必去理会或考虑在内。

但另有一条大原则就是在开庭审理的时候，应把所有发生了的事实去考虑在内。简单说，在一宗涉及疏忽导致一位有为青年瘫痪的案件，索赔的金额非常庞大。但在开庭审理的时候该青年奇迹般地康复，法院就没有理由不去考虑这一点并去判给该青年足够照顾他一辈子的巨额赔偿。但如果奇迹康复是发生在判决后的半

年，就不存在要去把多赔的钱要回来，因为是“一事不再审”（res judicata）。

只简单说，这在贵族院是一个非常具争议性的案件。最终导致了在5个勋爵中，以3比2多数意见作出判决。其中Bingham与Walker勋爵持少数意见并认为损失计算应该是以毁约后的4年市场租金的差价为准，这表示不去理会毁约后的海湾战争会导致该租约无法履行下去。但其余的3位勋爵认为大原则还是去给受害方船东“复原”的赔偿（compensatory damage），而不是让他去赚取比履行更好的结果，这一个地位应该以审理当天的情况为准。

10 笔者涉及的中国造船合约仲裁

另一个就是笔者处理的一个涉及造船的伦敦仲裁案件，涉及了中国船厂毁约后对原告希腊船东会带来的利润损失，这看来是与The “Golden Victory”一样的案件。这方面的争议是希腊船东声称在中国船厂毁约的情况下，去了韩国建造替代的船舶，但交船日子不一样，韩国的船舶迟了9个月交付，希腊船东便索赔这9个月的营运损失。碰巧，这9个月的期间，刚好就是航运市场最疯狂的时候，所以希腊船东索赔的金额非常庞大（因为涉及了4艘船舶）。笔者作为仲裁庭成员之一，就感觉到有夸大损失的可能性。其中，笔者向其他2位共同仲裁员（他们是英国的退休大法官）提出的疑问是造船合约中，中国船厂是有权去把合约约定的交船日期免费延长30天。之后，如果发生工程延误而无法交船，且延误不属于不可抗力（force majuere）的事件，船厂就要每天赔偿给船东约1万美元。此外，还有条文说明如果这种工程延误长达180天，就到了所谓的“死亡日期”（drop-dead

day），希腊船东有权去取消造船合约。这些都是造船合约的一些典型条文与安排，只说该造船合约订约时航运市场还不算高，所以每天要赔偿的工程延误的1万美元，只是希腊船东根据航运市场最疯狂的7万美元一天是相差了一大截。所以笔者的疑问就是希腊船东声称的2个造船合约交船日子相差的9个月利润损失应否减去30天的免费延长，且剩下的8个月利润损失是否应该以1万美元一天去计算？这相比以7万美元一天去计算9个月得出来的损失是天渊之别。

但笔者倒也不是根据The “Golden Victory”中贵族院多数意见的说法，就是在审理当天要去考虑所有的情况后去作出复原的赔偿。因为这一个案件不像The

“Golden Victory”，事实上发生了海湾战争，而是根据“balance of probabilities”去考虑中国船厂会否去延误交船（表示要去享用合约中的30天免费延长期与在剩下的延误赔偿1万美元一天）。笔者认为这种会延误交船的情况出现的可能性是大于不出现。这一来，就应该去考虑另一条有关损失的大原则，即损失赔偿应该以毁约方最低的合约责任为准。这方面只去节录Megaw大法官在The “Mihalis

Angelos” (1970) 2 Lloyd‟s Rep 43所说：

“If the contractual rights which he has lost were capable by the terms of the contract

of being rendered either less valuable or valueless in certain events, and if it can be

shown that those events were, at the date of acceptance of the repudiation, predestined

to happen, then in my view the damages which he can recover are not more than the

true value, if any, of the rights which he has lost, having regard to those predestined

events.”

但其他2位共同仲裁员坚持认为在毁约后的损失根据“breach day rule”是不应该去考虑如果履行造船合约的话会有怎么样的情况，也就是在本章前述的一连串先例，如：D.H. Bain v. Field & Co. Fruit Merchants Ltd. (1920) 5 . 16 ；British and Benningtons LTd. v. North Western Cachar Tea Co. Ltd., (1922) 13

. 67；Continental Contractors Ltd. v. Medway Oil and Storage Co., (1925) 23

. 124；Bulk Oil (Zug) A.G. v. Sun International Ltd., (1984) 1 Lloyd‟s Rep.

531；North Sea Energy Holdings v. Petroleum Authority of Thailand (1997) 2 Lloyd‟s

Rep. 418 。他们也没有给笔者太多的解释，但更大的问题就是中国船厂根本没有作出任何抗辩。这导致了笔者作为仲裁员，不会也不应为任何一方当事人争辩。在提出问题后，不论有无进一步的解释与答案，反正共同仲裁员不接受，笔者也就算了。结果显然是判中国败诉，要赔偿一笔笔者认为很可能是夸大了的损失。

当然还有不同看法是在事实的认定，就是2位共同仲裁员认为中国船厂如果履行合约，是会按时交船，不会有延误。这就表示不必存在“最低的合约责任为准”的说法。原因是在裁决书中有提及说：

“Firstly, if the tribunal asks itself the question: „When, but for the repudiation, would

中国船厂 have delivered the vessels? ‟, in point of law, it has to be assumed that 中国船厂 would diligently have performed the obligations undertaken by them under

the respective contracts. Secondly, while, of course, there might have been events by

way of force majuere which served to delay timely delivery of the vessels by 中国船厂, we consider that, if there were such events, it was for 中国船厂 to put them in

issue.”

去总结，在这个案件也可以看到中国船厂（或任何作为被告的中国公司）不去抗辩的危险。如果他作出抗辩并提供一些在期间已经发生了的不可抗力事件，会导致延误交船；或是提供他为其他买方在期间造船也都发生延误，并证明他延误比提早交船的可能性超出50%，都很可能会带来不同的结果。而这些证据的提供估计不会很困难，因为都是掌握在中国船厂的手中。所以，在这个世界上，要求公正公平还是需要靠自己的水平与能力去争取，而不会是天上掉下来的馅饼。